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 Abstract 
Populism has often been understood as a description of political parties 
and politicians, who have been labelled either populist or not. This disser-
tation argues that it is more useful to conceive of populism in action: as 
something that is done rather than something that is. I propose that the 
populist toolkit is a collection of cultural practices, which politicians and 
citizens use to make sense of and do politics, by claiming that ‘the people’ 
are opposed by a corrupt elite – a powerful claim in contemporary politics, 
both in Finland and internationally. The concept of the populist toolkit 
has analytical utility, since it can separate a set of populist repertoires from 
others, for example that of exclusionary nationalism, and takes seriously 
the effect culture has on action, while avoiding cultural determinism. 
I study four instances in which the populist toolkit was used in Finnish 
politics from 2007 to 2016. As data, I use party publications, a Voting 
Advice Application, newspaper articles and opinion pieces, and a large set 
of online media data. Methodologically, I employ qualitative text analysis 
informed by theories of populism, cultural practices, frame analysis and 
Laurent Thévenot’s sociology of engagements, as well as topic modeling. 
Article I argues that the state of the Eurozone in 2011 gave the Finns 
Party an opportunity to frame the situation as a crisis for Finland and to 
present itself as a righteous populist challenger to established parties. Ar-
ticle II shows that the Finns Party uses anti-feminist arguments to present 
itself as a populist alternative. Article III presents a theory of how populist 
argumentation can use familiar emotional experiences in bonding ‘the 
people’ together. Article IV tackles the populist epistemology: while pop-
ulism can be critical of intellectuals and experts in general, the article 
shows that another populist strategy is counterknowledge, incorporating 
alternative knowledge authorities. This strategy is particularly employed 
by the populist radical right. 
After the monumental success of right-wing populism in Western de-
mocracies, the next big question is whether left-wing or liberal actors will 
take up the tools of populism, or will they rather position themselves on 
the side of pluralism, democratic institutions and scientific expertise. This 
will have to be assessed by future studies. 
  
   
 Abstrakti 
Populismia on usein käytetty kuvailevana käsitteenä poliittisten puoluei-
den, poliitikkojen ja joskus myös äänestäjien ominaisuuksista: onko joku 
populisti vai ei. Väitän, että on tutkimuksen kannalta hyödyllisempää ym-
märtää populismi poliittisena toimintana, jossa erotetaan positiiviseen va-
loon asetettu kansa negatiivisessa valossa nähdystä eliitistä. ”Populismin 
työkalupakki” on kokoelma kulttuurisia käytäntöjä, joiden avulla niin po-
liitikot kuin kansalaisetkin ymmärtävät ja tekevät politiikkaa kansan ja elii-
tin vastakkainasettelun kautta. Populismin työkalupakki on käsitteenä 
hyödyllinen, koska se erottelee populististen käytäntöjen joukon muista 
työkalupakeista, kuten kansallismielisyydestä. Se huomioi kulttuurin vai-
kutuksen toiminnalle, välttäen kuitenkin kulttuurisen determinismin. 
Tutkin neljää tapausta, joissa populismin työkalupakkia käytettiin Suo-
messa vuosina 2007–2016. Aineistoina käytän Perussuomalaisten julkai-
suja, Helsingin Sanomien Vaalikonetta, yleisönosastoa ja journalistista mate-
riaalia, Hommaforumin keskusteluja sekä MV-lehden sisältöjä. Analysoin niitä 
käyttäen kvalitatiivista tekstianalyysia, jota ohjaavat populismin ja kulttuu-
risten käytäntöjen teoriat, kehysanalyysi ja Laurent Thévenot’n sitoumus-
ten sosiologia, sekä laskennallista aihemallinnusta. 
Artikkeli I osoittaa, että euroalueen talous vuonna 2011 antoi Perus-
suomalaisille mahdollisuuden kehystää tilanne kriisinä Suomelle, ja sa-
malla itsensä oikeamielisenä populistisena haastajana valtapuolueille. Ar-
tikkelissa II näytämme, kuinka Perussuomalaiset käyttää feminisminvas-
taisuutta esittääkseen itsensä populistisena vaihtoehtona. Artikkeli III esit-
telee teorian siitä, kuinka populismi voi käyttää hyväkseen tuttuja tunne-
kokemuksia sitoakseen ”kansaa” yhteen. Artikkeli IV käsittelee populismin 
tietoteoriaa: vaikka populismi on usein yleisesti asiantuntijakriittistä, toi-
nen mahdollinen populistinen tietostrategia on tuottaa vastatietoa ja 
vasta-asiantuntijuuksia, ja tämä strategia sopii erityisesti oikeistopopulis-
miin. 
Oikeistopopulismin länsimaissa saavuttaman suosion jälkeen on jatko-
tutkimuksissa olennaista kysyä, omaksuvatko vasemmistolaiset ja liberaalit 
toimijat jatkossa populismin työkalut, vai asemoivatko ne itsensä populis-
mia vastaan; pluralismin, liberaalidemokraattisten instituutioiden ja asi-
antuntijatiedon puolelle. 
  
  
  i 
Preface & Acknowledgements 
I became fascinated with populism in 2010 at the University of the West 
of England, while attending an excellent lecture and seminar series by Dr. 
Nicholas Startin on the ‘Rise of the Far Right in Contemporary Europe’. 
The (True) Finns Party was not yet a major player in Finnish politics and 
not widely known internationally. Thus, when other students and Dr. 
Startin eagerly questioned me for insight into the Finnish case during the 
seminars, I tended to downplay the significance of right-wing populism in 
Finland, both in terms of its prevalence and its radicalism. 
The unprecedented success of the (True) Finns in Spring 2011 after the 
inclusion of anti-immigrant activists in the party – a monumental event in 
Finnish politics – proved how wrong I was. Since that was also the time 
when I had to decide on a topic for my Master’s thesis, there was no other 
option in my mind than to start studying Finnish populism. This disserta-
tion is the culmination of that research project, as the Master’s thesis then 
left too many questions unanswered not to continue with a PhD. As the 
PhD is now complete, even more questions remain unanswered, as new 
ones have popped up constantly during this project. I now realize one 
could keep on studying Finnish populism forever. 
Populism in Finland has been very much a moving target in the past 
few years, and each day researchers, journalists and laymen alike offer 
thousands of interpretations, analyses and opinions of it on various media. 
This has made it difficult to focus on producing an analytical, academic 
understanding of the issue without being side-tracked by heated public 
debates. This is the nature of populist politics: it is aggressive, polarizing, 
and incites dramatic responses on purpose, as it divides people into ‘the 
people’ and its enemies. These enemies are the elite, who do not belong 
to the people, and in the case of nationalist populism, the Others, who do 
not belong to the nation. 
The two woodcuts printed on the cover of this book, originally pub-
lished in Swedish archbishop Olaus Magnus’ 16th-century landmark work 
Historia de gentibus septentrionalibus (History of the Northern Peoples), illus-
trate these two facets. In the top picture, peasants are attacking a bailiff’s 
castle, an image that in this context depicts the people taking power back from 
the elite; while in the bottom one, native Laps are throwing rocks at ap-
proaching ships they believe are pirates, to stop them from entering their 
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lands; excluding Others from the nation. While it would be anachronistic to 
claim the woodcuts depict Nordic populism in the 16th century, they do 
illustrate two central themes about 21st-century Finnish populism in ac-
tion. 
Some research on populism is conducted with the explicit aim of op-
posing populist politics, while some of it aims to facilitate populist mobili-
zation. I have always believed we should instead try to keep politics and 
research separate, even if it is difficult. Perhaps this also relates to my con-
viction that sociology should be primarily an empirical rather than a the-
ory-centric social science. My primary motivation as a sociologist is to un-
derstand the world. While as a citizen I disagree with many of the opinions 
of the people I study, as a researcher, I have always tried to approach their 
opinions, arguments and reasoning with an open mind, to try and under-
stand them as a sociologist. 
To be clear, I do not claim to be ‘objective’ – a utopia in research on 
politics – but I do claim to have striven to separate my moral judgment 
from my analysis while maintaining a critical sensitivity to the nuances of 
political argumentation, in an effort to get closer to the truth, even if it re-
mains perpetually out of grasp (Popper 1962). Moral condemnation is hu-
man, but as a basis of research it can only blur our vision, as psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt vividly describes in The Righteous Mind (2012). And as so-
ciologist Max Weber put it in his lecture Wissenschaft als Beruf (‘Science as 
a Vocation’) in 1918: “Whenever the man of science introduces his per-
sonal value judgment, a full understanding of the facts ceases.” (Translated 
by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 1946.) Still, as we know, Weber was 
no naïve positivist, a believer in our ability to simply acquire ‘scientific 
facts’ about society – but instead a staunch supporter of Verstehen, under-
standing. 
These are some of the principles that have guided me in this endeav-
our. Hopefully, my work will help others understand populism, regardless 
of whether they themselves oppose or support it. 
 
In the five years which I spent on this project I gained many new friends. 
Thankfully, I did not lose nearly as many. I want to thank Sonja Kosunen 
and Mikko Posti, two of my most long-standing friends, who have become 
my academic colleagues during our friendships. Conversely, many col-
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leagues at the Helsinki Research Group for Political Sociology have be-
come my friends during our time working together: Risto Alapuro, Georg 
Boldt, Veikko Eranti, Antti Gronow, Maija Jokela, Lotta Junnilainen, 
Anna Kukkonen, Markku Lonkila, Tomi Lehtimäki, Niko Pyrhönen; and 
my totally awesome supervisor and mentor Eeva Luhtakallio. An im-
portant member of that research network is Tuomas Ylä-Anttila, who has 
become my colleague as well, but in the first place has always been my 
brother. 
The part played by the rest of my family in me becoming a researcher 
has been considerable too, since they are all social scientists as well; my 
mum, dad and sister: Leena, Pekka and Anna. 
Other colleagues with whom I have had helpful discussions with about 
this work – and thus deserve my gratitude – include Paris Aslanidis, Sophy 
Bergenheim, Jesse Haapoja, Juha Herkman, Antti Hyrkäs, Ann-Cathrine 
Jungar, Habibul Khondker, Juuso Koponen, Hanspeter Kriesi, Salla-
Maaria Laaksonen, Tuukka Lehtiniemi, Mari Marttila, Dhiraj Murthy, 
Matti Nelimarkka, Cristian Norocel, Emilia Palonen, Takis Pappas, Nich-
olas Startin, Lasse Tarkiainen, Laurent Thévenot, Arho Toikka, Mikko J. 
Virtanen, Marjoriikka Ylisiurua, and numerous anonymous reviewers. 
The pre-examiners of this thesis, Benjamin Moffitt and Suvi Keskinen, 
were both sufficiently critical, as they should, each from their own per-
spectives. I have taken their comments into consideration to the best of 
my ability, even though I did not agree with all of them – which highlights 
that responsibility for any mistakes is, of course, only mine. 
During this project, something happened that is much more important 
than scholarship – I met my dear wife, Matilda Merenmies, whom I thank 
from the bottom of my heart for never-failing support and love, which I 
hope to return in full. 
 
Articles II and III were made possible by data published by Helsingin Sano-
mat. Computation for Article IV was performed on the Taito supercluster 
of the CSC IT Center for Science. University of Helsinki’s Language Ser-
vices proof-read a draft version of this manuscript. This research was 
funded by the Kone Foundation, the most progressive and forward-look-
ing social science supporter in Finland. 
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1 Introduction 
This is an empirical study of populism in Finland from 2007 to 2016, and 
a theoretical examination – based on that empirical work – of the toolkit of 
populism. Populism has thus far been most often understood as a descrip-
tion of political parties and/or politicians, who have been labelled either 
populist or not. Moreover, the term has been pejorative in connotation to 
many. But parties and movements all over the world increasingly often 
accept the label ‘populist’ not as an insult but as a badge of honour 
(Houwen 2011: 32). At the same time, claims about the supposed ‘popu-
lism’ of a variety of political actors on the left and right have become ever 
more commonplace (Houwen 2011: 28). As I will argue, it is more useful 
to conceive of populism in action: as something that is done rather than 
something that is. In this dissertation, I propose that it is a political practice 
– or, more accurately, a set of practices – that forms what we might call 
the ‘toolkit of populism’ (after Swidler 1986, also see e.g. Lamont & Thé-
venot [eds.] 2000; Silber 2003). 
Political actors use tools from this toolkit whether rarely or more often, 
and this is determined not only by their inclination to do so – are they 
‘populists’ or not, some might say – or which ideologies (see Stanley 2008) 
and ‘deep stories’ (see Hochschild 2016) they believe in.1 Crucially, it is 
also affected by the situation they are in, broadly construed (Boltanski & 
Thévenot 2006: 16–17; Joas 1996: 132–133, Luhtakallio 2012: 203). The 
situation includes the political culture within which they act (Eranti 2016: 
17–19), and what kind of and how much material and cultural resources 
they have at their disposal (Eranti 2016: 20–23). In the case of political 
parties, one often mentioned situational variable affecting their use of pop-
ulism is whether they are in government or in opposition: when in gov-
ernment, parties tend to use populist tools less (Kriesi & Pappas 2015: 9; 
Rooduijn, de Lange & van der Brug 2012). 
I have never cared much for disciplinary boundaries, and as such, this 
transdisciplinary work spans – at least – the fields of political and cultural 
sociology, social movements studies, political science, and political com-
munication. Still, my training as a political and cultural sociologist is un-
doubtedly evident in many preconceptions and methodological choices. 
                                                
1 On the value-basis of action, see Vaisey 2008, 2009, 2010. 
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Luckily, the field of populism studies – previously largely dominated by 
political scientists – has recently seen a resurgence of perspectives that can 
be deemed ‘sociological’ (see e.g. Hawkins 2010; Jansen 2011; Moffitt 
2016), whether or not their authors identify as sociologists (which is not 
important). 
If the conception of populism as a cultural toolkit was the first sign of 
my sociological perspective on populism; the second is the position that 
politicians and parties are only one instance of those doing politics. 
Breadth is the hallmark of a sociological conception of politics. Politics is 
something citizens do in social movements, labour unions, social move-
ments, party organizations and everyday discussions (Boltanski & Thé-
venot 1999) – in addition to what politicans do in campaigns and parlia-
ments. This is true of populism as well: not only politicians use the toolkit 
of populism. 
That is why this dissertation – despite taking Finland as its case – not 
only deals with the (True) Finns Party,2 identified and studied by political 
scientists as a populist radical right party (e.g. Arter 2010), but also popu-
list acts by politicians of other parties, non-affiliated activists, and ordinary 
citizens in newspaper opinion pieces and online discussions. These empir-
ical studies, published in academic books and journals in 2015–2017, are 
printed in this volume after this introductory and summarizing section. 
They each investigate a specific research setting related to the overarching 
research question of this dissertation: How was the cultural toolkit of 
populism used in Finnish politics from 2007 to 2016? 
In the next chapter (2), I will more comprehensively introduce ‘the pop-
ulist toolkit’, followed by a brief history of Finnish populism in chapter 3. 
Then, in chapter 4, I will present the research design, including research 
questions, and how to answer them in terms of data and methods. After 
summarizing the four empirical articles in chapter 5, I will wrap things up 
in chapter 6 with a discussion of the implications of this work for the study 
of populism. 
All in all, I will claim that understanding populism as a cultural toolkit 
enables us to study populist practices not only of parties labelled as ‘pop-
                                                
2 Perussuomalaiset. The first part of the party name, perus, refers to a fundamental 
ordinariness, with the latter part, suomalaiset, meaning Finns. They previously used 
the translation True Finns but adopted the official English name The Finns in August 
2011, after receiving international media attention (HS 21 Aug 2011). Having clarified 
this, I will refer to the party as the Finns Party. 
Introduction 
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ulist’, but everyday political actors including citizens participating in pub-
lic debates, and politicians not necessarily considered explicitly ‘populist’. 
Understanding populist practices, in turn, is critical to understanding con-
temporary politics, I argue. I will further empirically analyse four specific 
populist tools used in Finnish politics 2007–2016: I) creating conceptions 
of crisis, II) opposing hegemonic conceptions of gender equality, III) 
appealing to a familiar emotional experience and IV) questioning estab-
lished knowledge. These tools have enabled political actors to claim they 
represent ‘the people’ against a corrupt elite – a powerful claim in con-
temporary politics, both in Finland and internationally. 
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2 Populism 
[D]emocracy as we know it in modern polities is an uneasy combination of two 
different strands, populist democracy and liberal constitutionalism [...] In a 
sense, then, the populists are right to see in contemporary democracy a con-
spiracy to keep power from the people, and they are dangerous precisely be-
cause they are right. 
(Canovan 2005: 67, 85) 
Why is it important to study populism? After all, by choosing to do so, I 
have already used theory to delineate a piece of the social world to be 
studied. I have not, in this sense, followed Latour’s imperative “to follow 
the actors themselves” (2005: 12), but imposed my own concept on them. 
Despite some political actors self-identifying as populists, my definition for 
the word is one based on scholarly tradition, explicated below, and does 
not necessarily correspond to the understandings of the actors themselves. 
However, I will defend the usefulness of the concept in this chapter. 
In choosing ‘populism’, I have also made the choice not to frame what 
I study – at least primarily – in terms of ‘the radical right’ (Arter 2010), 
‘welfare nationalism’ (Pyrhönen 2015) or ‘anti-immigration activism’ 
(Mäkinen 2016), concepts that others have used as their primary tools to 
analyse the same empirical things, partly even the same data. I will argue 
in this chapter that a focus on populism, particularly, is useful for under-
standing certain facets of contemporary Finnish and global politics. 
2.1 A Contested Concept? 
It is customary to start any treatise on populism with the assertion that it 
is a contested concept, even a convoluted and conflicted one. However, 
this is an exaggeration. The term has been given enormous attention by 
scholars in political science, sociology, social psychology and communica-
tion, among some others. But in all of these, as Houwen (2011: 35) as well 
as Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser (2012a: 8) note, a remarkable number of 
authors have more or less agreed that the word denotes politics that 
posits a positively connoted ‘people’ against a negatively con-
noted ‘elite’ (e.g. Aslanidis 2015; Canovan 1999; Hawkins 2010; Jansen 
2011; Laclau 2005; Moffitt 2016; Mudde 2004; Stanley 2008; Taggart 
Populism 
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2000). What they disagree on is whether it is a logic (Laclau 2007), a dis-
cursive frame (Aslanidis 2015), a worldview (Hawkins 2010), an ideology 
(Stanley 2008), a mode of political practice (Jansen 2011), or a style (Mof-
fitt 2016). Indeed, as Wiles (1969) put it early on: “To each his own defi-
nition of populism, according to the academic axe he grinds” (p. 166). 
I would like to argue that this has to do mostly with the school of 
thought the author hails from, rather than any substantive analysis of what 
populism is. In an academic world of fragmented disciplines, it makes very 
little sense for a global group of scholars from various fields and schools to 
debate ‘what something is’, as the discourse theorist will always see dis-
courses, whereas the scholar of ideology will see the same thing as ideol-
ogy. (I am guilty of this as well, as someone who prefers the theoretical 
tools of pragmatic sociology, seeing most social things as practices, tools 
or repertoires – see Silber 2003.) 
Rather than depicting a field in a hopeless state of disarray, I would 
like to suggest that the fact that scholars of such different persuasions can 
even agree that something like populism exists and is relevant – and that 
the word means a kind of politics that posits a positively connoted ‘people’ 
against a negatively connoted ‘elite’ – speaks for the assertion that popu-
lism is, indeed, a somewhat stable and lasting feature of politics, globally. 
Whether we should see it as a style, an ideology, a practice or something 
else altogether is secondary, and depends largely on the methodological 
tools we wish to use to analyse it, and some of these conceptions are more 
compatible with one another than others. I will argue that one of the mer-
its of my ‘toolkit’ approach is that it can incorporate and utilize many of 
the other approaches, rather than attacking other schools of thought as 
inferior. 
As such, I am proposing that something called ‘populism’ does exist in 
a form stable enough to be studied – in the form of continued usage of 
populist practices in contemporary political spheres (see also Hawkins 
2010: 8). Paradoxically, this may be at least partly the result of the exten-
sive scholarship on populism: we know that the Finns Party chairman 
Timo Soini wrote his Master’s thesis on populism (Soini 1988) before 
founding the party, and that leading members of both Syriza in Greece 
and Podemos in Spain have been strongly influenced by the work of 
Laclau (Judis 2016). Thus, the scholarly concept of populism and the pop-
ulism of “the actors themselves” (Latour 2005: 12) have long ago been 
‘cross-bred’. Still, populism survives, with astonishing tenacity. 
Populism 
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2.2 The Populist Toolkit 
A practice turn (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina & von Sevigny [eds.] 2001) can be 
discerned in contemporary cultural and political sociology. Instead of the 
previous paradigmatic orientation of conceiving culture as “the entire way 
of life of a people” or a provider of “the ultimate values toward which 
action is oriented”, a practice-oriented approach sees culture as “the pub-
licly available symbolic forms through which people experience and ex-
press meaning”; that is, “such symbolic vehicles of meaning, including be-
liefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cul-
tural practices such as language, gossip, stories, and rituals of daily life” 
(Swidler 1986: 273). 
These practices, which can also be called cultural tools, both constrain 
and facilitate the social actions of people by providing a set of ways to 
communicate with others (Eranti 2016: 14–26; Luhtakallio 2012: 12). Col-
lections of these ‘tools’ form ‘toolkits’, which are recognizable orientations 
towards the social world. Populism, for example, is such an orientation 
towards politics. Others include ideologies such as liberalism or socialism, 
but also everyday “styles of action” (Lichterman & Cefaï 2006), like 
demonstrations, unionization, disobedience, voluntarism, activism, advo-
cacy, or campaigning. Political cultures are collections of such cultural 
toolkits, and as such, the ability of citizens to understand politics and par-
ticipate in it depends on the availability and diffusion of these toolkits. 
2.2.1 Why ‘toolkits’? 
This view makes it possible to take culture seriously, as culture does indeed 
constrain and enable social actions, but at the same time, prevents cultural 
determinism and gives weight to the free will of the actor. We as citizens 
do not act the way we do simply because ‘it is in our culture’ to do so, even 
though culture does guide our actions to an extent. The ‘toolkit’ view of 
political culture has been employed in recent political sociology particu-
larly in studies on social movements. It has helped to understand the dif-
ferent resources groups of people may have for political organization, be-
cause they have been taught different tools of participation (Baiocchi et al. 
2014). And it has shed light on the effect of national political cultures on 
citizenship and protest (Luhtakallio 2012). More broadly, it has given rise 
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to a new field of comparative cultural and political sociology (see e.g. La-
mont & Thévenot [eds.] 2000). Understanding populism as a set of cul-
tural tools helps us explain its sustained re-emergence across history and 
the globe, despite geographical differences and historical changes (Jansen 
2011; Moffitt 2016; Swidler 1986: 277–278). 
The toolkit perspective is not in conflict with the concept of ideology, 
since ideologies are “explicit, articulated, highly organized meaning sys-
tems” (Swidler 1986: 278); that is, particularly well-defined (if rather ab-
stract) cultural toolkits. For analysing populism theoretically or empiri-
cally, it is most often unnecessary to determine whether populism fulfils 
this criteria of ‘ideology’ (see e.g. Aslanidis 2015), since it does not often 
matter for the political actors using the tools of populism. In some cases, 
it may be an ideology, whereas in others it may be used as a more habitual 
toolkit.3 
Moffitt (2016) has previously taken a rather similar view to populism, 
drawing mainly on the writings on ‘political style’ by Hariman (1995), An-
kersmit (2002) and Pels (2003), as well as notes on the performativity of 
populism by Laclau (2005; 2007). He argues, likewise, for moving “from 
seeing populism as a particular ‘thing’ or entity towards viewing it as a 
political style that is performed, embodied and enacted across a variety of 
political and cultural contexts” (Moffitt 2016: 3, emphasis in original). For 
him, this style refers to “the repertoires of embodied, symbolically medi-
ated performance made to audiences that are used to create and navigate 
the fields of power that comprise the political, stretching from the domain 
of government through to everyday life” (p. 38). Moffitt himself notes that 
this resonates with what he calls “the turn towards social action in political 
sociology” (p. 38) – my attempt here is to more explicitly integrate the 
literature on populism, mostly written by political scientists, with that of 
contemporary political sociology. 
Moffitt does note that the word ‘style’ he uses may have a connotation 
of superficiality, which he does not intend to convey. Instead “[s]tyle and 
content are interrelated, and style can generate, affect and interact with 
content” (2016: 49). This is one reason I prefer to use the vocabulary of 
‘cultural toolkits’ rather than that of ‘style’ – to avoid the notion of super-
ficiality – in addition to explicitly connecting my work with Swidlerian 
                                                
3 One may imagine research settings in which the distinction between populism as 
organized ideology and populism as ‘merely’ habitual tools would be relevant – party 
institutionalization, for example. 
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cultural sociology. Like ‘style’, ‘toolkits’ should also be generally intelligi-
ble to scholars and laymen alike, avoiding sociological jargon. 
Understanding populism as a style leads Moffitt to focus on populist 
leadership (2016: 51–69), whereas my understanding of populism as a cul-
tural toolkit leads me to focus on the use of populist argumentation by 
ordinary citizens, particularly in Articles III and IV. This discussion dove-
tails with the notion in political sociology of ordinary citizens imbued with 
critical capacity, taking part in moral and political debates in everyday 
situations (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999). 
What is problematic about ‘tools’ as concepts, however, is that they 
may be confused with the view that populism is a demagogic vote-maxim-
izing tactic or strategy (e.g. Betz 2002; Weyland 1996; 2001). This is not 
my intention, because in the Swidlerian view, actors do not necessarily use 
these tools strategically as means to particular ends, but more importantly, 
the tools give their action meaning. In other words, they use the tools to 
make sense of the world, as frames (Goffman 1974), not (just) for political 
gains. Or, as Hawkins (2010: 29) puts it, populism is about “what politics 
should be and what democracy is for. This includes causal beliefs about 
how the world operates but also normative ones about how the world 
should operate.” The ‘tool’ metaphor may, unintentionally, somewhat ob-
scure the fact that values and worldviews do have effects on action.4 
In fact, Hawkins’ approach of ‘populism as a worldview’, cited above, 
is quite compatible with the one employed here as well, because it is a 
middle ground between discourse theory and a realist philosophy of sci-
ence: “the argument that our shared language ‘constitutes’ or creates our 
identities and accompanying roles gives too little causal force to our ge-
netic makeup and the material world around us [...] On the other hand, 
discourse theorists are absolutely right in arguing that we cannot easily 
disentangle ideas and language” (Hawkins 2010: 31–32). The notion of 
cultural toolkits nicely captures this idea of the role of culture: actors have 
agency, but it is somewhat limited (if also made possible!) by the cultural 
tools available to them. Moreover, the way the ‘toolkit theory’ is developed 
and operationalized in the work of Boltanski & Thévenot (2006) and La-
mont & Thévenot (2000) explicitly emphasizes that cultural tools are not 
purely discursive, but dependent on the material environment (as shown 
                                                
4 For a thorough critique of the Swidlerian school based on this assertion, see 
Vaisey 2008, 2009, 2010. 
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in Article III) – something that Hawkins (2010: 242) argues should be 
noted in future research into populism. 
2.2.2 What’s in the populist toolkit? 
Since the key definition of populism is that it posits a positively connoted 
people against a negatively connoted elite, its key task is to define ‘the peo-
ple’. It is always a subset of the population, since ‘the people’ as a popula-
tion-wide entity with a general will is a myth (Canovan 2005). This con-
struction of the people happens in contrast to the constitutive outside 
formed by the elite (Laclau 2005; 2007), and in the case of exclusionary 
nationalist (right-wing) populism, Others – typically immigrants – as ene-
mies of the people, which the elite unfairly prioritizes over the people, it is 
claimed (e.g. Sakki & Pettersson 2016). 
This central concept of ‘the people’ in populism is rather flexible: for 
example, in left-wing populism, the people is often defined in terms of 
class, whereas in right-wing populism it is often defined in terms of nation 
(Mény & Surel 2004: 172–196). But Taggart (2000) notes that despite this, 
what the concept does always imply is that ‘the people’ are “numerous 
and in the majority [...] so confer greater legitimacy on those who speak 
in their name” (p. 92). Using the populist toolkit, claims are made to rep-
resent “the silent majority”, who are “working, paying taxes and quietly 
getting on with life” (Judis 2016: 93), and have “no natural inclination to 
become involved with the minority (elite) pursuit of politics” (Judis 2016: 
93) – they are “reluctantly political” (Taggart 2000), and as such “it is the 
mass citizenry who represent the heart of the population and indeed per-
haps the very soul of the country” (Judis 2016: 93). This is who populist 
argumentation claims to represent. The Finns Party is named accordingly: 
in Perussuomalaiset, often translated as the ‘True Finns’, ‘Ordinary Finns’ 
or ‘Basic Finns’, the prefix perus refers to fundamental ordinariness as a 
virtue, similarly to expressions such as ‘down-to-earth’ or ‘straightfor-
ward’. 
The populist toolkit is a culturally shared interpretive framework that defines and 
valorizes the people, against the elite, and allows this distinction between the people and 
the elite to be used to understand society and do politics. Posing the people against 
the elite is the central tool.5 Some of the most typical supplementary tools 
                                                
5 By ‘against’, I mean both that the people is discursively constructed in contrast to 
the constitutive outside of the elite (in Laclauian terms), and that it is claimed to be in 
an antagonistic relationship, politically, with the elite. However, by ‘discursively’ I do 
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used to achieve and ground this central distinction include defining and 
denigrating Others who are to be excluded from the people, appealing to 
the people’s familiar experiences and emotions as a source of (moral) 
knowledge in various ways, and denouncing expertise. I will turn to these 
next. 
2.2.3 What’s in the Finnish populist toolkit? 
In the Finnish case, studied here, examples of the populist toolkit in action 
include the othering of Southern Europeans to construct a unified nation 
(Article I), ‘common-sense’ views of ‘caring’ womanhood against ‘elite’ 
feminists (Article II), invoking emotional belonging via nostalgic familiar-
ity (Article III), and denouncing knowledge authorities (Article IV). In all 
these cases, a line was drawn between the people and its enemies. But 
these cases by no means constitute an exhaustive list of uses of the populist 
toolkit in Finland, 2007–2016, merely four notable examples. And these 
examples are indeed somewhat specific to the Finnish case and the studied 
instances of political actors, most of whom can be defined as nationalists 
in their ideology. For example, the othering of Southern Europeans in the 
context of the Eurocrisis was only possible because of Finland’s economic 
and political standing in the Eurozone, and particularly suited for a na-
tionalist flavour of populism, which the Finns Party turned to. Demoniz-
ing ‘elite’ feminists was particularly salient because of the Finnish dis-
course of ‘achieved’ equality, and particularly suitable for a right-wing 
conservative value base. The nostalgic familiarity evoked in the case of 
Suvivirsi was made possible by the Finnish tradition of singing the hymn. 
And regarding knowledge, valorization of experiential knowledge seems 
specifically compatible with rural populism, whereas counterknowledge is 
more suited to anti-immigration populism. (All these will be elaborated in 
chapter 5.) 
Still, all of these tools could be adapted and employed elsewhere by 
other types of populist movements, with certain modifications: the other-
ing of Northern Europeans was conversely used by Greek populists during 
the Eurocrisis (see Aslanidis & Ylä-Anttila 2014). Antifeminism is a noted 
feature of the populist radical right (Keskinen 2013). Shared experiences 
of singing emotional songs have been used to cement nationalist populist 
                                                
not mean that this construction would happen purely discursively, irrespective of the 
material world, as I explained in 2.2.1. I will also come back to this in 2.4, as well as 
Article III. 
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sentiments in Russia (Oushakine 2011), arguments appealing to emotion 
have been noted to be typical to populism (Berezin 2001, 2002, Canovan 
1999, Demertzis 2006, 2014), and anti-intellectualism is an age-old popu-
list trope (Hofstadter 1962, Saurette & Gunster 2011). 
In other words, while the particular cases are specific to Finland, the 
forms of action (Simmel 1971), the populist tools, seem to be somewhat 
shared cross-culturally. They can thus be used by populist movements 
globally, according to the particular affordances granted by their context. 
Populism is global, even though there are variances between local popu-
lisms. Or, as Luhtakallio (2012: 12) puts it in her comparison of French 
and Finnish political cultures: “[T]here may be a hammer in both French 
and Finnish kits, although not an identical one.” 
2.2.4 Populism and other political toolkits 
Finally, to help us further understand what the populist toolkit is, let us 
briefly compare it to some other political toolkits. First of all, in terms of 
modes of participation (Ekman & Amnå 2012), I mentioned before that 
many of the toolkits political sociology recognizes are tools of informal 
democratic participation, such as demonstrations, but populism is most 
often identified in the sphere of party politics instead. I suspect this is not 
because there is no populism outside of party politics, but rather because 
populism has received the most attention from political scientists, who 
tend to focus on party politics, whereas sociologists have concentrated 
more on extra-parliamentary modes of politicization. I attempt to bridge 
these disciplines to the best of my ability in this work, particularly in arti-
cles III and IV. 
Secondly, and analytically, a useful distinction is to understand popu-
lism as the opposite of technocracy. While technocracy emphasizes intellec-
tual expertise, populism values ‘folk wisdom’ or alternative experts 
(Cramer 2016: 123–130; Hawkins 2010: 7; Hofstadter 1962; 2008; Oliver 
& Rahn 2016); technocracy stresses formal conduct whereas populism is 
about disregard for established manners; technocracy is the ideology of 
stable progress but populism preaches crisis and cataclysm. In fact, crisis 
is an “internal feature of populism” instead of “something that is purely ex-
ternal to populism” (Moffitt 2016: 9) – populism appropriates crises and 
creates them in hearts and minds. Crises do not exist without someone 
interpreting them as such, as we argue in Article I. This axis between tech-
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nocracy and populism can also be called a ‘high–low’ axis of politics be-
tween ‘good’ and ‘bad manners’, along with the more established (one 
might say ideological) axes of left–right and conservative–liberal (Moffitt 
2016: 43–48; Ostiguy 2009; Ostiguy & Roberts 2016; Wiles 1969: 170). 
This emphasizes populism’s gradational nature: a political actor is not ei-
ther ‘populist’ or ‘non-populist’ but can be more or less populist at various 
times and in various situations, as I have argued (see also Gidron & Boni-
kowski 2013: 9; Hawkins 2010; Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). 
And thirdly, regarding populism’s empirical co-occurrence with other 
ideological toolkits, exclusionary nationalism is a toolkit that populism is 
often combined with – to the extent that many observers confuse the two 
with each other. This is something I will address next. 
2.3 Why Populism? 
Why concentrate on populism – why not the populist radical right (Mudde 
2007), for example, which conceptually includes exclusionary national-
ism? After all, most of the empirical work in this book is on the right-wing 
populist Finns Party and other nationalist political actors. As noted previ-
ously, plenty of academic research is carried out on similar empirical ma-
terials, but under the varying labels of ‘populism’, ‘racism’, ‘nativism’, 
‘welfare chauvinism’, ‘the radical right’, and so on. I argue for the im-
portance of understanding populism, in its own right, for five reasons. 
First, populism is a broader concept than the populist radical right, to 
which it is often reduced; and this is useful for my work. As the recent rise 
of non-right-wing populist movements and parties such as Syriza in 
Greece, Podemos in Spain and M5S in Italy, and the near-successful can-
didacy of Bernie Sanders in the US shows, populism without the right-
wing component is quite possible (and currently salient). This makes an 
understanding of populism itself particularly important for understanding 
contemporary societies; we seem to be living in times of populism, not just 
right-wing populism (Chwalisz 2015; Moffitt 2016). And even right-wing 
populism follows the logic of populism: 
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Populists may also target particular Others – such as asylum seekers, immigrant 
workers or particular minority groups – as enemies of ‘the people’, but these 
Others will be linked to ‘the elite’. For example, it might be argued that ‘liberal 
elites’ have allowed increased immigration, which has led to an influx of mi-
grants, which has threatened ‘the people’s’ livelihood. 
(Moffitt 2016: 43–44) 
But while populism without the exclusion of Others demonstrably ex-
ists, cases of the opposite are more rare in modern Western polities: right-
wing exclusionary movements that do not use populist claims.6 This, I sus-
pect, is largely because most European constitutions and transnational 
treaties – indeed, a larger societal consensus – is explicitly anti-racist; and 
thus to be explicitly, politically racist, or even to publicly oppose immigra-
tion and multiculturalism, one has to be anti-establishment to an extent, 
in which case anti-immigration values may lead to adopting populist prac-
tices. 
In fact, the second reason to study populism is that an empirical link 
between populism and exclusionary nationalism is often implicitly or ex-
plicitly posited, but not explicated. Furthermore, there are hints of a cau-
sality going both ways, which have been neglected by lumping ‘right-wing 
populism’ together as a monolithic phenomenon. A possible mechanism 
of anti-immigration values necessitating populist practices, because of a 
societal anti-racist consensus, was mentioned above. Conversely, a prop-
osition of populism as a cause of exclusionary nationalism is evident in 
accounts that explain radical-right voting by insecurity and resentment felt 
by ‘globalization losers’. These are argued to result from economic and 
societal changes brought about by a relative loss of status, rendering glob-
alization losers susceptible to “frames that scapegoat immigrant groups” 
(Rydgren 2013: 6). Such analyses, I would like to argue, explain populism, 
which is based on a people’s resentment of the system, but not right-wing 
populism – for that, one would need an additional mechanism explaining 
why the scapegoating frame is adopted. In other words, why is the resent-
ment directed at immigrants? 
To be fair to Rydgren, he does provide possible mechanisms; namely 
the ethnic competition thesis, according to which “voters turn to the new 
radical right because they want to reduce competition from immigrants 
                                                
6 An elitist racist movement that does not care about appealing to ‘the people’, for 
example, would qualify, as pointed out by Benjamin Moffitt in the pre-examination of 
this dissertation. 
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over scarce resources such as the labor market, housing, welfare state ben-
efits, or even the marriage market” (Rydgren 2007: 250). There are also 
possible “supply-side” (Rydgren 2007: 242) explanations, i.e. ones related 
to the politics that is ‘available’ to voters in the party system: while there 
is now a right-wing populist ‘option’ in most electoral systems, many coun-
tries simply lack a credible left-wing alternative for someone who wants to 
‘vote populist’. (Which leads one to ask: why?) Still, these mechanisms re-
main understudied, possibly because of the conflation of populism and the 
radical right; for example, to what extent are the motivations for voting 
populist and voting radical right the same? Why do structural problems in 
contemporary Western societies (often identified as the primary source for 
the populist momentum) tend to be blamed on immigrants (something 
which the populist radical right excels in)? These are questions that merit 
further research. 
Third, numerous scholars have by now analysed the nationalist and 
nativist features of the Finns Party, its opposition to immigration, the rac-
ism and sexism exhibited by some of its politicians, and both online and 
offline anti-immigration activism in Finland. They have e.g. classified the 
Finns Party as a populist radical right party (Arter 2010), noted the diffi-
culty of integrating online anti-immigration activism within a party 
(Hatakka 2016), noted the antifeminism of online anti-immigration activ-
ists (Keskinen 2013), connected the anti-immigration movement with con-
cerns over the welfare state (Keskinen 2016; Pyrhönen 2015), and with 
neoliberalism (Mäkinen 2016; Nykänen 2016). What is lacking is research 
on the populist component intersecting Finnish politics, not only right-
wing movements (however, on Finnish populism, see Helander [ed.] 1971; 
Paloheimo 2012; Wiberg [ed.] 2011). While clearly populism and nation-
alism are intertwined, nationalism has drawn most of the attention. This 
has been the case in spite of exit polls in the 2011 elections – in which the 
Finns Party truly made its mark (see Article I) – finding that “wanting to 
see some change in a stagnant party system”, a typical populist proposi-
tion, was the top reason for voting for the Finns Party (Borg 2012: 201). 
Nationalist and conservative issues such as curbing immigration, support-
ing traditional values, and opposition to the EU closely followed, but still, 
in this light, populism has been understudied in the Finnish case. 
Fourth, the reasons advanced for the supposed primacy of the nation-
alist component in study of contemporary European right-wing populism 
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tend not to be very convincing. Mudde (2007: 16) states that for contem-
porary European radical right populist parties, “the core concept is un-
doubtedly the ‘nation’”, while populism comes second, if “one looks at the 
primary literature”, but is unclear what that literature is. He then proceeds 
to define right-wing populist parties by their nationalism, arguing in a 
manner which to me seems circular: nationalism is the core ideological 
component for a party family he defines by its nationalism. Rydgren 
(2007) asserts that a doctrine of opposing ethnic mixing, rather than pop-
ulism, “is the most distinguishing ideological characteristic of the new rad-
ical right party family” (Rydgren 2007: 244), basing this largely on his as-
sessment that “populism is a characteristic but not a distinctive feature of 
the new radical right” (p. 246); other parties use populism as well. But 
again, if we set out to study something defined as the radical right, it makes 
sense that we find that it largely corresponds to the features we expect to 
see in the radical right. I do not claim to have indisputable grounds for the 
primacy of populism in contemporary European right-wing populist 
movements either; merely that there are insufficient grounds to simply 
subsume it under “the populist radical right”. 
And finally, fifth: separating populist practice from right-wing populist 
practice, xenophobic practice, racist practice, or exclusionary practice is 
in line with my theoretical conception of populism as a toolkit and fits what 
I do empirically. Populism, nationalism and racism are not labels for peo-
ple, they are things that are done – toolkits in action: it is simply untenable 
to label someone a ‘radical right-wing populist’ and expect them to act like 
one at all times. Political actors may use the populist toolkit and they may 
use right-wing tools; this work focuses primarily on the populist toolkit, for 
the reasons explicated above, but touches upon radical right tools as well 
since they often go together. 
Recently, Stavrakakis et al. (2017) have taken a step in the right direc-
tion in an article which attempts to break the ‘reified association’ of pop-
ulism and far-right politics. Still, they fall short of understanding populist 
and right-wing tendencies in contemporary politics as separate but inter-
connected phenomena, often but not always employed by the same polit-
ical actors. Instead, they again focus on the unnecessary exercise of label-
ling contemporary right-wing populist politicians as primarily right-wing, 
and only secondarily populist, based on a methodology of finding the 
“core signifiers” of each discourse (Stavrakakis et al. 2017: 1), but actually 
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using politicians as the unit of analysis and labelling them. Again, a circu-
lar definition causes issues here: it is not very surprising to find that the 
analysed politicians are right-wing, since the politicians chosen for analysis 
were selected because they were right-wing (Geert Wilders and Marine Le 
Pen). 
In my view, breaking the reified association between the far right and 
populism requires a commitment to refrain from labelling any single actor 
as ‘far right’ or ‘populist’ (or ‘far right populist’ or anything of the sort), 
instead analysing separately the right-wing and populist practices exhibited 
in political action. 
2.4 Roots of Populism 
Why are populist tools currently so popular in democracies the world 
over? In which contexts does populism thrive? A direction in which Mof-
fitt’s (2016) understanding of populism as political style leads him is the 
media. The mediatization of contemporary societies leads public spheres to 
focus on precisely the features that populism kindly provides: simplifica-
tion, polarization, personalization, emotionalization and the prioritization 
of conflict and scandals (Strömbäck 2008; Bos, van der Brug & de Vreese 
2011; McManus 1994; Sabato, Stencel & Linchter 2000; cited by Moffitt 
2016: 70–94). The mass media also enables communication of “images of 
‘the people’ [...] combining potent symbolism (flags, signs, crowds, colours 
and so forth) with a visual sense of cohesion and homogeneity amongst 
‘the people’ [...] strongly implying presence and corporeality – and thus 
existence – of ‘the people’” (Moffitt 2016: 104). And furthermore, with the 
rise of social media comes “the valorisation of commentary from ‘non-
elites’ in the forms of blogs, mailing lists and the like, [in which] we see 
both a glorification of ‘the people’ and ‘common sense’, and an associated 
dismissal of expert knowledge” (Moffitt 2016: 91–92), which I deal with 
more comprehensively in Article IV. 
But since populism’s historical roots are demonstrably American 
(Houwen 2011; Judis 2016; Kazin 1998; Wiberg 2011),7 I believe that one 
                                                
7 There were, of course, roughly at the same time as the original American Popu-
lists (in the late 1800s), the Narodniki in Russia, comprised of “middle-class intellectuals 
who endorsed a romanticized view of rural life” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012a: 
3). Whereas the American Populists’ tradition remained ‘bubbling under’ and raised 
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often overlooked avenue for understanding European populism is to un-
derstand American populism, even though there are some crucial differ-
ences.8 In the case of the Finns Party, some indicators of direct influence 
include the fact that their youth organization arranges study trips to the 
Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC, see issue 2/2013 of the 
Finns Party Youth’s magazine); a list of influencers on the website of the 
party think tank’s director, Simo Grönroos, includes Ron Paul and Pat 
Buchanan; and in 2017, chairman Timo Soini participated in the Na-
tional Prayer Breakfast in Washington, D.C. (Yle 16 Dec 2016). Some key 
activists of the Finns Party are looking to US conservatives for example, 
making them rather unique in Finnish politics in this sense. These links 
have thus far been missed in research on Finnish populism and would de-
serve further scrutiny. 
Even more importantly, recent research on US populism has noted 
some important issues that seem applicable to populism elsewhere as well. 
Namely, resentment and deservingness have been identified as two intercon-
nected experiences which can act as seedbeds for populism. Cramer 
(2016) identifies in contemporary American politics a politics of resentment, 
in which “political differences [...] have become personal. In a politics of 
resentment, we treat differences in our political points of view as funda-
mental differences in who we are as human beings” (p. 211). In explaining 
this, she notes a strong rural–urban divide: The Tea Party (and, more re-
cently, Donald Trump) were heavily supported in rural areas – which ap-
plies to the Finns Party as well (Borg 2012: 196). Cramer argues that rural 
support for populism is rooted in a “rural consciousness” (p. 5), “an iden-
tity as a rural person [which] includes a sense that decision makers rou-
tinely ignore rural places” (pp. 5–6). The key to that consciousness is that 
                                                
its head multiple times during the 1900s (Kazin 1998), Russian Narodnik ideology was 
quickly superseded by socialism. 
8 The Anglo-American two-party system with first-past-the-post voting effectively 
provides a niche for populist challengers who position themselves as ‘outsiders’ from 
the established duality (Canovan 2005: 38, 72; Judis 2016: 12–87, 43–45). And in the 
American two-party system, the left–right and liberal–conservative axes are conflated 
– so that the left wing is also liberal and the right wing is conservative – making Donald 
Trump’s usage of the populist low–high axis particularly disruptive: it is radically dif-
ferent from the single axis employed by all other politicians (Moffitt & Ostiguy 20 Oct 
2016). Furthermore, Canovan (2005: 127) notes that the populist ‘myth of redemp-
tion’, in which power is returned to the people from corrupt politicians, corresponds 
to the United States’ foundation myth, in which Americans overthrow their British 
rulers and found a democracy of popular rule. 
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rural people are “hard working and [thus] deserving” (p. 6) – resentment 
is a result of not getting a fair reward for hard work. It is about “feeling 
overlooked, ignored, and disrespected” (p. 40) economically and culturally 
– and this feeling is strongly tied to place. It is not just about money, since 
most of the people interviewed by Cramer, and Hochschild (2016) as well, 
do not want welfare money, but want to work for it. With hard work comes 
deservingness (Cramer 2016: 88). Working hard but not receiving amounts 
to a sense of injustice and victimhood: “These days, American men are an 
endangered species too”, as one of Hochschild’s (2016: 61) informants 
puts it. 
Hochschild (2016) connects this to an American ‘deep story’ – “a story 
that feels as if it were true” (p. 16) – about working hard trying to earn your 
place in the world, while some ‘cut in line’ (public sector workers, blacks, 
refugees, immigrants – people who supposedly do not work as hard, pp. 
136–151). Hard work, not getting anything for free, is an honour. Cramer 
(2016: 101) calls this “a pervasive work ethic” and “a fighting American 
spirit”. One could well ask how different this is from the Finnish deep story 
of sisu – ‘tenacity’ – working (together as a nation) to achieve something 
better through hardship. In both cases, social welfare recipients are viewed 
as lazy and undeserving; rewards must be earned. On this view, the worst 
insult not just to you personally but your (national) identity is when some-
one from abroad comes and takes the welfare check you have proudly 
refused. Money should be earned (Mäkinen 2016; Pyrhönen 2015). 
Indeed, such resentment is a powerful political tool of populists every-
where: the fact that “conservative politicians encourage people to focus on 
the undeserving” has not only been noted recently by Cramer (2016: 167) 
in the US, but by Hoggett, Wilkinson and Beedell (2013) in the UK, and 
by Judis (2016: 100) in the case of the Danish People’s Party. Everywhere, 
those who value hard work and deservingness despise ‘freeloaders’. At the 
same time, left-wing parties that used to represent the workers’ interest, 
have become more focused on social and cultural issues such as minority 
rights, which many working-class people see as betrayal (Judis 2016: 56–
57; Kazin 1998: 5; Kitschelt 2004: 9). 
In fact, according to Kazin (1998), a historian of populism, the late 19th-
century roots of populism are in a producer ethic: “it held that only those who 
created wealth in tangible, material ways (on and under the land, in work-
shops, on the sea) could be trusted to guard the nation’s piety and liberties” 
(Kazin 1998: 13). The ‘elite’ opposed by the original populists, the “money 
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power” (bonds, stocks etc.), was power “whose value was not directly con-
nected to human labor” (Kazin 1998: 20). 
This elucidates why a cultural emphasis on hard work and deserving-
ness is still stressed by populist appeals, which in turn may explain why 
working-class men are overrepresented among populist voters every-
where, including Finland (Borg 2012: 195) – not because of direct eco-
nomic concerns over immigration, as is sometimes argued, but via culture 
and identity (Oesch 2008; Rydgren [ed.] 2013). It’s still “NOT the econ-
omy, stupid” (Kaufmann 2016; Mudde 2007) – instead populist parties 
are largely parties for cultural discontents of the ‘globalization losers’ (Kriesi 
et al. 2008). They are, above all, less educated workers, “who tend to work 
in sectors that are shrinking in Western Europe” (Rydgren 2013: 1). They 
have “cultural capital invested in ‘old’ modes of production” and thus 
“have found themselves in social decline” in terms of status and future 
prospects, at least in relative terms (Rydgren 2013: 7). This creates a crisis, 
a breakdown, a disruption in cultural terms – a point in time that is ripe for 
political reorientation and adoption of new frames to interpret reality – 
such as the populist toolkit (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999; Eranti 2016: 13–
26; Rydgren 2013: 5–9; Snow et al. 1998; Swidler 1986: 278–280). 
Finally, to revisit the argument that crisis causes populism (e.g. Haw-
kins 2010: 86–165), I take the position that rather than being structurally 
caused by crisis, the populist toolkit frames situations in terms of crisis and 
attributes guilt for it (to elites and Others). Of course, creating crisis out of 
thin air is not easy – a situation that can be interpreted as a crisis, and thus 
an opportunity for populist mobilization, must exist (Eranti 2016: 13–19). 
This highlights the usefulness of a theoretical framework which considers 
both discourse and material affordances (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006: 16–
17; Hawkins 2010: 31–32). I will further explore this in Article I, which 
deals with how the Finns Party appropriated the economic crisis from 
2010 onwards. 
2.5 Consequences of Populism 
Opponents of populism tend to understand it as a threat to democracy, 
while its proponents believe it epitomizes democracy. Indeed, the populist 
toolkit is not inherently democratic or antidemocratic. Even on the very 
simplest analysis, democracy consists of at least both the will of the people 
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and democratic institutions designed to uphold the rights of individuals 
and the rule of law. Populism is for the enactment of the will of the people 
as directly as possible, but against most of the institutions, which are seen 
by populists as unnecessary restrictions (Moffitt 2016: 136). As such, it re-
flects an inherent tension within liberal democracy, between ‘redemptive’ 
and ‘pragmatic’ democracy (Canovan 1999; 2005) – democracy as a pro-
vider of feelings of exaltation over the success of a common cause, and 
democracy as ‘business as usual’, taking care of everyday governance. 
Both are needed, but populism tries to tip the scales from the bureaucratic 
to the effervescent. 
As such, among populism’s possible positive effects on democracy, one 
can count that it “can give voice to groups that do not feel represented by 
the elites, by putting forward topics relevant for a ‘silent majority’”, “mo-
bilize” and “represent excluded sections of society”, “increase democratic 
accountability” and “bring back the conflictive dimension of politics and 
thus help revitalize both public opinion and social movements in order to 
foster the ‘democratization of democracy’”. On the other hand, un-
checked populism may “contravene the ‘checks and balances’ and sepa-
ration of powers of liberal democracy”, “circumvent and ignore minority 
rights”, and “lead to a moralization of politics, making compromise and 
consensus extremely difficult” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012a: 21). 
These are two sides of the same coin, and the balance between them 
largely hinges on the stability of democratic institutions in the polity in 
question, as well as the success of populism. It seems that the institutions 
populists would like to demolish are just what protect societies from the 
potentially detrimental effects of populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 
2012b: 210). 
As such, the effects of populism in a polity are an empirical question, 
which also has been studied comparatively (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 
[eds.] 2012). At least in the cases of Belgium (de Lange & Akkerman 2012) 
and Canada (Laycock 2012), populism has had mildly positive effects on 
democracy by forcing mainstream parties to be more responsive and mak-
ing democracy more direct. In Belgium, the electoral gains of Flemish In-
terest (VB) have coincided with increases in political trust and satisfaction 
with democracy (de Lange & Akkerman 2012: 41–44), and the party has 
contributed to an “increase of political awareness, interest, and participa-
tion” (p. 43). And in Finland, the rise of the Finns Party contributed to a 
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rise in voter turnout and interest in politics in 2011 (Elo & Rapeli 2012: 
289). 
However, in the cases of Greece and Hungary (Pappas 2014), highly 
polarized and unstable ‘populist democracies’ have emerged as a result of 
populist practices becoming the new norm, instead of merely representing 
a democratic challenge, with irresponsible fiscal policies and the state be-
ing unable to protect vulnerable minorities. In Peru, Levitsky & Loxton 
(2012: 160) argue, the popularity of populism led to “the destruction of 
institutional checks and balances”, and ultimately Alberto Fujimori’s au-
thoritarian regime, shadowed by extrajudicial killings and other human 
rights abuses. In Austria as well, successful use of the populist toolkit by 
radical right-wing parties contributed to a situation where the “rights of 
minorities were either ignored or reduced” (Fallend 2012: 134). In the 
Venezuelan case, while Hugo Chávez originally campaigned on a demo-
cratic populist platform and was received optimistically by both the ma-
jority of Venezuelans and many scholars; it was precisely his populism and 
its accompanying dismissal of institutional restraints on power that ulti-
mately made his reign so detrimental to democracy and the economy 
(Hawkins 2003; 2010). As in the proverb, populism seems to be a good serv-
ant but a bad master. 
Still, movements using the populist toolkit can also achieve political in-
fluence even without getting their representatives elected, because they 
present radical alternatives which shift the discursive field, making the un-
imaginable imaginable (Laycock 2012). UKIP’s influence in realizing 
Brexit was undeniable, despite having only a single elected Member of 
Parliament. Such ‘unrealistic’ demands are as much ideological as strate-
gic to populism. When Donald Trump says he will build a wall on the 
Mexican border and make Mexico pay for it, or when Syriza proposes 
that Greece default on its debts, these are not just policy positions, but 
ways of differentiating the speaker from mainstream politicians, siding 
them with ‘the people’ rather than ‘the elite’, enabling them to represent 
a true paradigm shift instead of the old incremental policy modifications 
(Judis 2016: 30, 118–119, 130, 134–135, 158–160). Getting elected might 
in fact be undesirable to someone heavily reliant on populist tools, because 
being in power and having to deal with responsibility is not well-suited to 
presenting yourself as a radical alternative to the establishment (Fallend 
2012; Judis 2016: 140). There is a case to be made for the merits of popu-
list uprisings in ‘waking up’ democracies, but in many cases, it seems best 
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for both the polity and the populist that they end up just short of coming 
to power. 
In the end, the consequences of populist successes have to be assessed 
politically rather than scientifically. What is to some a redemptive experi-
ence of ‘the people’s voice’ being finally heard in politics is an abhorrent 
display of the tyranny of the masses to another. 
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3 Populism in Finland 
Since the dominant view of populism in political science has been that of 
populism as an ideology, and most research has conflated populism with 
right-wing movements (e.g. Arter 2010, Hatakka 2016, Keskinen 2013, 
2016, Nykänen 2016), there is no existing research on Finnish populism 
as a practice in the sense explained previously; looking at the use of pop-
ulism by various political actors, that is, populism in action. Instead, works 
on Finnish populism thus far have considered only empirical instances that 
have been a priori named ‘populism’ – that is, ‘populist parties’ – and even 
those are few in number (e.g. Helander [ed.] 1971; Paloheimo 2012; Wi-
berg [ed.] 2011). This chapter provides a concise survey of the history of 
Finnish parties that have been identified as ‘populist’, to contextualize the 
empirical articles that will follow. It regrettably lacks material on the his-
tory of populist action outside of ‘populist’ political parties. 
The Finnish Rural Party (Suomen maaseudun puolue, SMP) was founded 
in 1959 as a breakaway faction from the Agrarian League (Maalaisliitto, 
founded 1906), by Veikko Vennamo, a former Agrarian League MP. This 
happened at the beginning of an era of intense urbanization and structural 
change in the Finnish society and economy; from an agrarian society to 
an urban, industrial and service-based one, accompanied by a liberaliza-
tion of social norms and the mainstreaming of mass media (Sänkiaho 
1971). The Agrarian League responded to the changing times by catering 
increasingly to urban voters as well, renaming itself the Centre Party in 
1965 – precisely the kind of development Vennamo wanted to oppose. 
His Rural Party’s ideas and rhetoric were those of classical agrarian pop-
ulism: he particularly often spoke of ‘the forgotten people’, referring to the 
underprivileged victims of urbanization, specifically small farmers. The 
enemy was the political and economic elite in the cities, ‘the money 
power’, which Vennamo famously referred to as ‘crime lords’ (rötösherrat) 
(Soini 1988: 23–40). He was to remain chairman until 1979, after which 
his son Pekka Vennamo took the helm; but even then Veikko remained 
parliamentary group leader, truly personifying his party throughout its 
lifespan. 
The Rural Party, or simply the Vennamoists (vennamolaiset), had two 
peaks of success. The first was in the general election of 1970, with 10.5% 
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of the vote and 18 MP’s, largely attributed to a protest against urbaniza-
tion and structural transformation of the economy (Sänkiaho 1971). The 
second came in the 1983 elections, with 9.7% of the vote and 17 MP’s, 
after a campaign heavily focused on exposing alleged corruption among 
political and business elites (Räisänen 1989: 7–16). This time, the party 
entered government in a coalition with the Social Democrats, Centre 
Party and Swedish People’s Party. 
In government, the party was plagued by internal strife: while Pekka 
Vennamo was now party chairman and a government minister, his father 
Veikko was still the chairman of the Rural Party parliamentary group, and 
his polemical style was more suited to opposition politics than govern-
ment. These two strong leaders disagreed on significant policy issues in-
cluding nuclear power, which impacted the government’s credibility and 
efficiency negatively, as Veikko continued criticizing his own party’s ac-
tions in government as if he was still an opposition leader (Räisänen 1989: 
42–45). This led ultimately to numerous defections, a loss of popularity, 
Veikko Vennamo’s retirement, and the party finally ended up bankrupt 
in 1995. 
But by 1979, a 16-year-old Timo Soini had already joined the Rural 
Party. He had seen Veikko Vennamo speak at a party rally the previous 
year and was so impressed that he embraced Vennamo’s populism and 
became his apprentice (IS 5 July 2003). Soini steadily advanced in the 
ranks of the party. He became vice-chair in 1989, the year after graduat-
ing from the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki, with 
a Master’s thesis about populism – a work of political theory and practice 
from which a deep admiration of his mentor Vennamo shines through 
(Soini 1988). He ran unsuccessfully for parliament for the fourth time in 
1995, as one of the last candidates the Rural Party fielded. But after the 
bankruptcy of the party that year, he became one of four Rural Party vet-
erans to found the Finns Party in its place. He was first named as the vice-
chair and party secretary, then chairman in 1997. 
In 2000, Soini stated in an interview (Karjalainen 2 Dec 2000) that he 
wanted to build the Finns Party into “the same kind of right-wing populist 
party that exist in Norway and Austria”, referring to the Progress and 
Freedom parties that were starting to gain ground. He speculated on re-
naming the party the Progress Party, and said he was looking for a new 
charismatic leader, in fact a “prophet” who could “channel the people’s 
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agony”, and forecast a 10% vote for the new party. But he ended up be-
coming that leader himself. 
While the Finns Party had started out as a successor to The Rural 
Party, with largely similar agrarian populist positions and rhetoric, party 
leader Soini was true to his word and started a shift towards the right, as 
well as catering to urban voters. The first major sign of this was the par-
liamentary candidacy and election of former boxer and show wrestler 
Tony Halme in 2003, on a provocative anti-immigrant platform (Jungar 
2016: 119–120). This was also the first time Soini himself became an MP, 
after five failed attempts, thrice with the Rural Party and twice as a Finns 
Party candidate. 
But the big shift to the right and to the immigration issue started in 
earnest with an online movement, Hommaforum, which is further analysed 
in Article IV. It was founded in 2008 after lively discussions which took 
place in Jussi Halla-aho’s blog’s guestbook. Halla-aho, a Helsinki aca-
demic linguist, had started his blog Scripta in 2003 (with the tagline: ‘Writ-
ings from the sinking West’), and positioned it within the global counterji-
hadist movement, most acutely represented by the Gates of Vienna blog 
(which later inspired Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik; see 
Archer 2013). Halla-aho’s blog and Hommaforum brought together Finns 
who wanted to politicize immigration, and particularly make Islam a cul-
tural-political issue in the public sphere. 
While this new online anti-immigration scene was initially divided on 
whether to enter parliamentary politics – and if, through which party – 
the anti-immigration movement quickly took parliamentary form within 
the Finns Party. First, Jussi Halla-aho ran for parliament as an independ-
ent Finns candidate in 2007, but did not get elected. At this time, immi-
gration was still a minor issue for the party, but Halla-aho’s candidacy 
(and Halme’s before him) had started to change this, as we see in Article 
I. 
In 2008, Halla-aho was elected as Helsinki city councellor. This at-
tracted the attention of the media, gave increased visibility to the move-
ment and led many of the activists to join the Finns Party ranks. While 
party leader Soini was reluctant at first to include this new movement in 
his party, denying Halla-aho candidacy in the European elections of 2009 
for example, he must eventually have realized the electoral potential of 
combining his established brand of populism with the radical right posi-
tions advocated by the new movement. Several Hommaforum candidates 
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ran on the Finns Party ticket in 2011, with phenomenal results, further 
analysed in Article I. 
Veikko Vennamo, Timo Soini and Jussi Halla-aho have been monu-
mental figures for Finnish party-political populism. But while the first two 
represent a relatively seamless continuation, the last two have been at odds 
with each other. While Halla-aho has advocated making the Finns Party 
more focused on opposing immigration, Soini has preferred to not talk 
about the issue, while at the same time allowing his party to include strong 
anti-immigrant voices – and this has proved crucial for the party’s success, 
for which Soini has worked for his whole life. 
Announcing his retirement after 20 years as party chairman in an emo-
tional interview in March 2017, Soini expressed his pride in building up 
the Finns Party from the ashes, but also a hint of regret for “some of the 
things that have been built up with it” (MTV News 5 Mar 2017), a thinly 
veiled reference to the rise of the anti-immigration movement. The fol-
lowing morning, the party office held a press conference announcing MEP 
Sampo Terho as a candidate for chairman, complete with perfectly-timed 
tweets of support from several popular names of the party. Terho pre-
sented himself – and, indeed, was presented by the party leaders – as 
someone who could unite the party’s agrarian-populist and radical-right 
factions, as Soini had somewhat successfully done, and seemed quite cred-
ible at it. 
But he was challenged by Halla-aho, the unofficial leader of the anti-
immigration faction. His supporters rallied behind him, starting an online 
campaign on Hommaforum to get as many of them as possible to register as 
members of the party and to show up in person to vote at the party con-
vention. The project proved successful, with Halla-aho beating party elite 
favourite Terho on the first round of voting on 10 June 2017. This imme-
diately resulted in the split of the party: three days later, 21 MPs loyal to 
Soini and Terho defected, forming their own group, hastily and rather 
ambiguously named ‘Blue Future’ (Sininen tulevaisuus). The Finns Party, 
now led by Halla-aho, was kicked out of government by the other two 
ruling parties due to “fundamental differences in our values” (IL 10 Jun 
2017) and because they refused to further toughen up immigration policy 
(Yle 12 Jun 2017), and the splinter group Blue Future was included in 
government in the Finns Party’s stead. 
The anti-immigration faction had now won the battle over control of 
the party, but at high cost. As for Blue Future, the Soini-loyal spinoff, it is 
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too early to tell at the time of writing (August 2017) what their ideological 
niche will be, and whether or not it will succeed.9 In terms of brand-build-
ing and party institutionalization, it will be an uphill battle. And as for 
populism, both parties will likely continue employing its tools – to what 
extent and in what ways will be investigated by future studies. 
  
                                                
9 Some hints were given on 14 August 2017 (Yle) when the new group presented 
their first policy suggestions: lowering taxes for the working and middle classes and 
small businesses, raising them for the most well-off and big corporations. These may 
signal an attempt to continue the Rural Party left-populist tradition and distinguish 
Blue Future from right-wing populism. 
Populism in Finland 
 30 
 
 31 
4 Research Design and Datasets 
Empirically, this study takes as its starting-point the observation that Finn-
ish political culture has traditionally employed institutionalized mecha-
nisms of consensus. There has been a strong cultural requirement to frame 
political arguments in terms of efficiency and rationality (Eranti 2016; 
Lonkila 2011). Disagreements are often framed as technical, instead of be-
ing based on ideological struggles – compared to France, for instance 
(Alapuro 2005; Lamont & Thévenot [eds.] 2000; Luhtakallio 2012; Ylä-
Anttila 2010: 100–103). However, the proliferation of populism seen in 
the 2010s is introducing new tensions, emotional argumentation, and po-
larization. This leads to the main research question of this book: How 
was the populist toolkit used in Finnish politics from 2007 to 
2016? This is answered via the four more specific questions of the four 
empirical articles: 
1. Did the Eurocrisis affect populist mobilization in Finland, and if so, how? 
2. How does gender matter for the Finns Party, quantitatively and discursively? 
3. How can emotional familiarity be used for doing populism? 
4. How are claims about knowledge used in doing populism in online media? 
To study such questions dealing with populist political action in various 
situations, there is a case to be made for getting ‘closer’ to political actors, 
to achieve thicker descriptions and understanding in the form of in-depth 
interviews or ethnographic participant observation (in the case of right-
wing populism, see Berezin 2007; 2009). However, using text as data has 
other merits: it is the most prominent medium of public political commu-
nication, increasingly so in the age of social media, for formal and informal 
political discussions. Text data can provide a representativeness difficult 
to achieve otherwise (Bail 2014). 
Still, texts are always written by someone, for someone, and convey a 
particular representation of reality, not an accurate reflection of it. This is 
‘a feature, not a bug’, if you are interested in the depictions and interpre-
tations of reality in those texts, such as using the populist toolkit. In fact, 
in the case of investigating populism as a facet of political culture, they are 
central, since populism is something intersubjective, something that hap-
pens in communication between individuals (Hawkins 2010: 70). Another 
way to put it is that texts contain traces of worldviews (Hawkins 2010: 
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238), and these traces are what we can reliably observe. Below, I elaborate 
on why I use different types of text data in this work. 
4.1 Party Materials 
Manifestos, party newspapers and other party publications are some of 
the most classic materials of political science. They lend themselves well 
to assessments of official party positions and their change over time (see 
e.g. the Manifesto Project, http://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/), but only 
represent views sanctioned by the party office. They do not necessarily 
cover all views espoused by politicians of the party, not to mention candi-
dates, voters or other supporters. Manifestos and newspapers by the Finns 
Party were used for a qualitative analysis in Article I, in which the central 
interest was the change in the party’s policy frames brought about by the 
economic crisis. They were also used in Article II, but in that case com-
plemented by Voting Advice Application data, described below. 
4.2 Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) 
Voting Advice Applications (VAA, Vaalikone) are online questionnaires 
meant to facilitate voter choice. The candidates answer multiple-choice 
questions on topical political issues, and can also make open-ended com-
ments on them. The prospective voters can then answer the same ques-
tionnaire, and have the application calculate a compatibility percentage 
between them and each candidate. The voters receive the percentages in 
the form of a compatibility ranking of candidates, hence the ‘voting ad-
vice’, and can compare the candidates’ answers with their own. VAAs 
have become popular in Finnish elections in the 2010s (Mykkänen 2011: 
17) and have very high rates of candidate participation: 80.0% of the 2011 
parliamentary candidates answered the VAA by Helsingin Sanomat (HS), 
Finland’s largest daily newspaper. This creates a comprehensive dataset 
of candidates’ policy positions and justifications for them – essentially a 
candidate survey with both multiple-choice and open-ended text answers. 
HS publishes the candidate responses as Open Data, freely available 
online for journalists, citizens and researchers. I use the open-ended com-
ments from the 2011 HS VAA data in Articles II and III. 
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Some of the advantages of VAA data include that they are largely un-
moderated by either the parties or the VAA operators, whereas official 
party publications only represent views sanctioned by the party office, and 
media data can be biased; populists particularly often claim it is, a discon-
tent which researchers should take seriously. Additionally, the VAA covers 
all candidates, not just elected representatives. 
The downside is the brevity and specificity of the free-text answers, 
which stem from each one being a comment on a specific multiple-choice 
question. Thus, even the open-ended answers lend themselves best to a 
fairly specific and restricted coding scheme rather than discourse analysis, 
for example (see e.g. Hawkins 2010: 71). This is why I used them for a 
quantitative gender-comparative content analysis in Article II, and com-
plemented them with media data in Article III. 
4.3 Media Data 
The mass media is perhaps the most important discursive field of the pub-
lic sphere of modern democracies, where political actors engage in debates 
and compete for influence (Bail 2012; Habermas 1962; Koopmans & Ol-
zak 2004; Ylä-Anttila & Luhtakallio 2016), making media data crucial for 
studying public debates, as I do in Article III, in an analysis based on Lau-
rent Thévenot’s sociology of engagaments (Thévenot 2001; 2007a; 2007b; 
2014). 
But media data always comes with bias, as it is moderated and edited 
by press gatekeepers – which is why I also employ VAA data in Article III. 
This has the additional benefit of having a perspective on politicians’ views 
on the issue, not just those of journalists, opinion piece writers, interview-
ees and others whose messages are conveyed by the media. 
4.4 Textual Big Data from Online Media 
While the jury is still out on the effects of online and social media on de-
mocracy (see e.g. Adamic & Glance 2005; Dahlgren 2000; Gil de Zúñiga 
& Valenzuela 2011; Hargittai, Gallo & Kane 2008), what we know is that 
online media of various types are becoming increasingly important for 
public debates. While the caricatural social media is an unrestricted free-
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for-all, some online media are just as subject to editorial oversight as print 
media, and most fall in between: production of content is open to many 
(pseudonymous registered users, most often) and editorial policy is lax. 
The boon of online media for social scientists is the availability of social 
data. Never before have we been able to gather so many ‘naturally exist-
ing’ discussions, network links and other records of people going about 
their daily business; working, shopping, procrastinating and talking poli-
tics with others – doing things we social scientists are interested in. At the 
same time, advances in natural language processing and machine learning 
have made it possible to analyse such big social datasets. This has led to a 
burgeoning Big Data movement within the social sciences (see Adamic & 
Glance 2005; Bail 2014; boyd & Crawford 2012; Cioffi-Revilla 2010; 
Conte et al. 2012; Grimmer & Stewart 2013; Halavais 2015; Hanna 2013; 
Hopkins & King 2010; King 2011; Laaksonen et al. 2017; Lazer et al. 
2009; Purhonen & Toikka 2016; Wallach 2014). This movement is as 
much about new data as it is about new methodology, because big datasets 
are useless without the means of analysing them. 
The development of these methods and data also affect the social itself, 
since social media and the changing habits of its use – new facets of social 
action – are largely based on the same technological advances as the Big 
Data movement studying them. An example of such a change is the ad-
vent of ‘countermedia’, the subject of Article IV. The opportunity for an-
yone not only to communicate online, but to produce new knowledge 
claims and found new media to authoritatively disseminate them, are top-
pling the established epistemic authorities of the media and public officials. 
In Article IV, online ‘alternative news’ posts and anti-immigration dis-
cussions (altogether a bit over 330,000 posts) were used as text data and 
analysed by a combination of topic modeling (Bail 2014; Blei 2012; Di-
Maggio, Nag & Blei 2013; Evans 2014; Levy & Franklin 2013; Meeks & 
Weingart 2012; Mohr & Bogdanov 2013; Mohr et al. 2013) and qualita-
tive, interpretive frame analysis (Entman 1993, Nisbet 2009). The role of 
the computational analysis was to locate the discussions of interest in a 
way that is representative and reproducible, while the qualitative frame 
analysis provides an interpretative understanding, a thick description 
(Geertz 1973) not possible with computational methods. 
While content analysis based on word frequencies has previously been 
cricitized in the study of populism, topic modeling partly circumvents the 
problem, which is that “the ideas that constitute the underlying worldview 
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are held subconsciously and conveyed as much by the tone and style of 
the language as by the actual words” and that “there is no single word or 
phrase distinct to populist discourse or a particular location in the text 
where we can usually go to find the speaker’s ‘statement of the issue’” 
(Hawkins 2010: 71). It does this by focusing on word co-occurrences rather 
than particular words, taking into account the relationality of meaning, 
that is, the fact that words have different meanings in different contexts 
(DiMaggio, Nag & Blei 2013). Still, there needs to be a significant element 
of post-modeling interpretive work, as I will argue. 
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5 Original Publications Summarized 
The empirical research in this dissertation consists of four articles, which 
fall into two main sections. The first two document the rise of the Finns 
Party using material from 2007 to 2014, and employ two different view-
points; that of the economic crisis, and that of gender and equality pol-
itics. The last two analyse populism more broadly than just in parliamen-
tary politics: in the media and online discussions. They use data from 2011 
to 2016, and proceed from the perspectives of emotions and 
knowledge. The order of the articles is thus roughly chronological, start-
ing from how the current political landscape came about, before moving 
on to scrutiny of the situation as it is now; but also proceeds from a general 
and descriptive standpoint towards a more specific and analytic angle, as 
well as from parties to individuals as political actors (Eranti 2016). 
5.1 Article I: Crisis 
Article I was co-authored by Tuomas Ylä-Anttila and myself as part of a 
comparative, collaborative book project led by Hanspeter Kriesi and 
Takis S. Pappas ([eds.] 2015). In it, we claim that the state of the economy 
provided the Finns Party with an opportunity to frame the situation as a 
crisis and to present itself as a righteous populist challenger to established 
parties. 
The volume, European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession, takes 
crisis as its departure point. Innumerable scholars have noted that crisis 
and populism go together in one way or another, but there is considerable 
disagreement on whether crisis is an exogenous phenomenon that causes 
populism, or whether populism creates crisis, by spreading claims that there 
is one, thus creating the crisis in hearts and minds, taking advantage of 
events and giving them a particular political interpretation (Moffitt 2014) 
– in the words of Eranti (2016: 13–19), turning crisis into opportunity. The 
book sets out to empirically test the causal hypothesis that crisis causes 
populism, by comparing 17 European countries. In each, the chapters 
look at the ‘independent variable’ of whether the country experienced a 
(political or economic) crisis in the wake of the economic recession, and 
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the ‘dependent variable’ of whether this crisis resulted in a rise of populism 
in that country. 
While the results are not entirely clear-cut, the hypothesis that eco-
nomic and political crises fuel populist success is supported by the country 
cases in the volume (Kriesi & Pappas 2015: 303–325). However, the cases 
are so diverse that this is by no means a linear relationship. In our chapter 
on Finland, we propose that political, cultural and economic specificities 
must be considered in explaining national populist successes. 
First of all, we note that before the economic crisis which hit Europe in 
2009–2010, the Finnish party field was stagnant, having been dominated 
for two decades by ‘The Big Three’: The Centre Party (formerly the 
Agrarian League), the Social Democrats and the moderate-right National 
Coalition. While the populist Finns Party had made some progress, they 
were marginal until their breakthrough in 2011, right after the crisis. 
In line with the edited volume’s shared conceptual definitions, the ar-
ticle considers populism a ‘thin-centred’ ideology combined with compli-
mentary ideologies to form a complete ideological base (Freeden 1998: 
750; Mudde 2004: 544; Stanley 2008). It compares Finns Party electoral 
manifestos from 2007, 2008, 2011 and 2012, together with twelve pre-
election issues of the party newspaper Perussuomalainen (‘The True Finn’) 
from 2007 and 2011 via a qualitative content analysis. We argue that 1) 
the party ideology’s ‘thin’ core is that of populism: a defence of the com-
mon people against the corrupt elite. This core is complemented by 2) a 
left-wing populist defence of the underprivileged against market-led poli-
cies promoted by the elite and 3) a nationalist defence of the sovereignty 
and unity of the Finnish people against immigration and the federalist 
tendencies of the European Union. 
Over the timespan in question, 2007–2012, tenet 2 (framing the people 
as the underprivileged class) of their ideology has been downplayed and 
tenet 3 (framing the people as the nation) emphasized. This was done to 
exploit the discursive opportunity (Koopmans & Olzak 2004) presented by the 
Greek economic situation. In the Finnish case, it enabled the populist 
party to shift from blaming domestic elites to blaming the Southern debtor 
countries of the EU. All in all, the party indeed benefited from the crisis, 
but not directly or structurally (such as generating widespread unemploy-
ment resulting in resentment), but by gaining an opportunity to frame 
their politics in a salient way: by giving the European economic crisis a 
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nationalistic interpretation, as a crisis for Finns as Europeans, directing 
resentment against the Southern countries. 
In the party’s 2007 and 2008 campaigns, economic justice for the un-
derprivileged had been central, with manifestos and newspapers touting 
slogans such as ‘YOUR social security is in danger!’, ‘For justice, well-
being and rule by the people!’ and ‘Protest so they can feel it!’ The elite 
was described as ‘corrupt cognac drinkers’, ‘big money’ and ‘stock option 
predators’. Nationalism was visible as opposition to the EU because the 
‘Finnish model of the welfare state was being cut back because of various 
EU-led strategies’, but anti-immigration candidates were peripheral and 
did not receive much space in the official party materials. 
This changed profoundly after the economic crisis. The Finnish econ-
omy was doing well in 2008, but was very dependent on heavy industry 
exports, the demand for which dramatically declines in a recession (Rou-
vinen & Ylä-Anttila 2010: 11). This means that the economic crisis did 
affect Finland, but with a delay: it did not, for example, create widespread 
unemployment or bankruptcies. A wealthy state and a stable job market 
buffered the crisis. The severe political effects came only in 2010 when 
Greece began seriously faltering. 
When it became clear that EU countries would have to save Greece 
from going bankrupt, the Finns Party was the only one that could feasibly 
oppose this plan, which was very unpopular amongst the Finnish elec-
torate (Pernaa 2012: 20–22), the mainstream parties being tied to their 
commitment to the EU project (Railo 2012: 231). This enabled the Finns 
Party to present themselves as a radical alternative to the perceivedly cor-
rupt mainstream parties – fulfilling the populist promise. Moreover, fram-
ing their populism as more strongly nationalist than before enabled them to 
speak for ‘all Finns’, not just the underclass, as their previous left-populism 
had done. 
Our analysis of the 2011 manifestos and newspapers shows an in-
creased emphasis on national sovereignty of the Finnish people, and the 
elite the party opposes is now the ‘cheaters and liars of the Eurozone’ – 
specifically, Greece, into which party chairman Timo Soini now claims 
Finland is ‘shoveling money’. This is very much in line with the populist 
notions of hard work and deservingness, reviewed in chapter 2.4. 
We conclude that in the Finnish case, populism did get a significant 
boost from the economic situation, because it enabled the populist party 
to present itself as a righteous challenger to the corrupt mainstream parties 
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and as a protector of the Finnish people. This was not a direct, structural, 
causal effect, but a result of the agency of the party, responding to a 
changed situation by modifying its toolkit and framing, employing more 
nationalist elements. This also made it a more appealing option for the 
growing anti-immigration movement, further analysed in Article IV. 
5.2 Article II: Gender 
Article II was co-authored with Eeva Luhtakallio for another comparative 
European book project, Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe (Köttig, Bitzan 
& Petö [eds.] 2017). It shows that the Finns Party uses notions of tradi-
tional femininity and masculinity to oppose a hegemonic conception of 
gender equality and present itself as a populist alternative. 
Finland has strong traditions of equality politics, manifested as ‘state 
feminism’: a plethora of policies aimed at improving gender equality as 
part of the welfare state project, together with strong representation of 
women and the feminist movement within party politics and state struc-
tures (Kettunen 2008: 128–171; Holli & Kantola 2005; 2007). However, 
despite enjoying broad cultural acceptance in principle, state feminism 
faces implementation problems since the issues of equal pay, equally 
shared parental responsibilities, gendered violence, and male-dominated 
political and business leadership have in fact faced stagnation rather than 
strong progress in the 21st century (Holli & Kantola 2007). Finnish gender 
equality discourse has a paradoxical duality about it: equality politics are 
considered a matter of national pride, and equality even enjoys the status 
of a hegemonic discourse; but discrimination persists on multiple fields of 
society, and criticizing it is often met with denial, since ‘in Finland, we 
already have equality’ (Holli, Luhtakallio & Raevaara 2006; Luhtakallio 
2012). 
What are the consequences of a proliferation of right-wing populist pol-
itics, dominated by men, in such a case? We analyse two facets of the Finns 
Party’s rise: firstly, the party’s internal gender gap, comparing the VAA 
answers of their male and female candidates for the 2011 elections; and 
secondly, the party’s discourse on gender and equality, analysing their 
2011 electoral manifesto, the 2011 and 2012 volumes of the party maga-
zine Perussuomalainen (‘The True Finn’), and public materials produced by 
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the party’s womens’ organization that were available on their website and 
in the National Library of Finland. 
We used open-ended responses by the candidates as qualitative mate-
rial to analyse the candidates’ justifications for their positions, not just sim-
ple policy choices, which were then compared quantitatively. The mate-
rial revealed a left–right gender gap. When asked about income inequal-
ity, a minority of men (13%) argued in a typically right-wing fashion that 
income inequality is in fact good, because it rewards competition; a small 
minority. But the percentage of women who argued so was zero. A majority 
of male candidates (39%) advocated the levelling of income cleavages on 
social justice grounds, but the percentage of women who did so was higher 
(56%); furthermore, female candidates more often did so on grounds of 
poverty relief and explicitly mentioning the underprivileged (42%); over 
twice as often as men (19%). 
Both the men and the women of the Finns Party were equally opposed 
to immigration, and justified this mostly on economic grounds, arguing 
that immigration was supposed to be financially beneficial and not detri-
mental ‘for Finland’. Some also mentioned immigrant crime and ‘cultural 
incompatibility’ of (Muslim) immigrants and native Finns. 
But when asked about homosexual adoption rights, a gender gap 
emerged again in that female Finns Party candidates were decidedly more 
liberal, defending equal rights for sexual minorities (30%) more than twice 
as often as men (14%). Very few women resorted to the argument that 
heterosexuality is ‘normal’ and homosexuality ‘abnormal’ (10%), whereas 
male candidates did so more than three times as often (31%). 
In sum, whereas we already knew the Finns Party represents radical 
right-wing populism and is male-dominated, this analysis showed that this 
is no coincidence and the connection also holds true within the party, its 
male candidates voicing more right-wing and socially conservative moral 
arguments than its female candidates. The party’s hard-line right-wing 
politics seems to be partly a product of its male majority. 
As for the Finns Party’s use of gender and equality framing, we ana-
lysed written materials produced by the party women’s organization, and 
relevant portions of the party’s 2011 electoral manifesto, together with the 
2011 and 2012 volumes of the party newspaper (articles that either men-
tion the party’s women, gender, or equality). We show that the party 
women’s organization mostly speaks of issues that are important to the 
party as a whole (such as unemployment, pensions and veterans), rather 
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than emphasizing their role as women. They explicitly state they are ‘not 
feminists’, and when they do talk of women’s issues, they speak of a tradi-
tional, domestic, caring womanhood. Motherhood is emphasized, and 
staying home taking care of children instead of working is portrayed as an 
important women’s right. The traditional role of women is of great im-
portance for the nation, because “the family is the basic unit of society and 
children are the future of the nation” (Finns Party electoral manifesto 
2011). Even if women become politically active, they must continue to 
take care of the home: “We are women who, year after year, work for the 
party for the sake of the common good along with doing the everyday 
chores” (The True Finn 9/2012). The role of women in the party, accord-
ing to our reading of the party materials up to 2012, is largely to support 
the male leadership. 
All in all, our results show that while the success of the Finns Party 
contributes to a turn to the conservative right in Finnish politics, it does so 
particularly in terms of gender. The hard-line right wing of the party is 
mostly a product of men, and the gender and equality politics of the party 
are conservative, even anti-feminist. The ‘ordinary’ women of the party 
are portrayed as outsiders compared to the feminist women of the main-
stream, ‘elite’ parties. The paradoxical duality of Finnish political dis-
course on gender equality provides a convenient tool for conservative pol-
itics to argue against further equality policies, because it offers the argu-
mentative frame of equality ‘already achieved’. 
5.3 Article III: Emotional Familiarity 
Article III moves from the Finns Party towards populism understood more 
broadly. It forms a pair with Article IV, which focuses on knowledge, by 
focusing on emotion. Specifically, it presents a theory of how populist ar-
gumentation can use familiar emotional experiences in bonding ‘the peo-
ple’ together. It does so by analysing the Finnish debate on Suvivirsi, the 
Summer Hymn, primarily by using Laurent Thévenot’s pragmatist sociol-
ogy of engagements (Thévenot 2001; 2002; 2007a; 2007b; 2009; 2011a; 
2011b; 2011c; 2014; 2015) to analyse media texts from 2002 to 2014 and 
political candidates’ opinions and justifications in 2011 (VAA). 
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Suvivirsi, which pupils in Finnish schools traditionally sing at spring 
graduation ceremonies, has become a site of political struggle. Some ques-
tion whether Christian hymns are appropriate in public schools, while oth-
ers defend the cultural tradition. Right-wing populist arguments empha-
size the hymn’s Finnishness (even though it is originally Swedish) and de-
fend it against a cultural threat they claim has been introduced by (Mus-
lim) immigrants. 
To most Finns, it is a familiar practice enabling remembrance and tra-
dition. That familiarity is used to anchor right-wing populist discourse in 
shared experience. Through its familiarity, Suvivirsi provides a vessel to 
connect political argumentation with a solid base of everyday practices, 
which produce experiences of belonging, to bridge the gap between famil-
iar experience and institutional politics. 
Laurent Thévenot’s sociology of engagements separates the typical 
sphere of politics, the regime of justification – in which conventionalized 
value-systems such as market exchange, traditions, or rational efficiency 
are accepted as yardsticks of what is measurably valuable (Boltanski & 
Thévenot 1999; 2006; Thévenot 2001: 71) – from the regime of familiarity, 
in which people can act from habit, without critical reflection on the value-
basis of their actions, while maintaining a feeling of ease (Thévenot 2007: 
416; 2011b: 14–16; 2014: 13–15, 19–28). Objects we engage with in the 
familiar regime, which may be material or cultural artefacts, and which 
Thévenot calls commonplaces, are invested with a “strongly personal engage-
ment” and breed “confidence” (Thévenot 2011a: 49). They “are not 
merely symbols, or signs, because they are the vehicle for deeply personal 
attachments” (Thévenot 2014: 20). Familiarity is perhaps best described 
“by the phrase: ‘inhabiting a home’” (Thévenot 2001: 69). We have a per-
sonal relationship with our everyday material and cultural surroundings, 
we are used to them. Suvivirsi is a prime example of a commonplace. 
 Such familiar engagement using commonplaces can take the form of 
political action, even though it is “not taken into account in most ap-
proaches to politics” (Thévenot 2014: 10). Commonplaces can even be 
“instrumental in support of authoritarian power” (Thévenot 2015: 98), 
since they are “by construction, rather foreign to strangers” (Thévenot 
2015: 98) – while they form a strong bond between those who share them, 
they also exclude strangers. This is also apparent in the Suvivirsi debate, 
and is what gives Suvivirsi its exclusionary power. In the debate, two solu-
tions emerge: that of justification (appeals to shared values) and that of a 
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return to familiarity (appeals based on an experience shared by a commu-
nity). The latter is more compatible with populism, because it constructs 
a people around the commonplace and valorizes the felt experience of the 
people participating. This is the analytical dichotomy I employ: justifica-
tion vs. familiarity. For example, when a participant in the debate argued 
that Suvivirsi should be sung because it has been done for decades, this 
argument was classified as justification based on the generally accepted 
value of cultural traditions. On the other hand, when participants referred 
to the concrete situation or the experience of singing the song and the 
emotions it evokes, the argument was classified as based on familiarity. 
 In total, I located 67 appeals to justification and 33 appeals to familiarity 
in the 139 documents of the media material on Suvivirsi. 
Most of the debate focused on whether Suvivirsi should be identified as 
part of the social worlds of ‘culture’ or ‘religion’, and then justifying opin-
ions by referring to the worth of Suvivirsi in that world. However, partici-
pants also reminisced about their experiences of singing Suvivirsi as school-
children, and noted how singing the song now arouses ‘feelings of nostal-
gia’. The singing of Suvivirsi was described as ‘beautiful and tender’, some-
thing ‘most Finns have experiences of’, even ‘a part of the shared experi-
ence of many generations’. The hymn contains ‘a powerful emotional 
charge’ which can elicit even physical responses: it can ‘move’ you and 
‘make you weep’, cause ‘shivers’ and ‘make your heart pound’. Such ex-
pressions do not appeal to a shared cultural value-system but a shared fa-
miliar experience, a commonplace – crucial to claiming convincingly that 
this is what ‘the people’ feel. 
The cultural and religious justifications seen in the media debate were 
reflected in the 2011 VAA candidate questionnaire as well (with 199 ap-
peals to justification), but familiarity was also salient (with 55 appeals) – 
particularly for Finns Party candidates (with 24 appeals). For them, the 
heartfelt emotional familiarity of the song is powerful. Many seem to gen-
uinely feel insulted by the potential ‘loss’ of the experience – it is not just 
about the song itself, but the continued practice of singing it – and for 
some, this should count as an argument, without need for further justifi-
cation. As the song represents something familiar, the candidates see the 
practice of their offspring continuing this tradition as a touching gesture 
of the succession of generations. 
The meaning of the song cannot be grasped by referring to its lyrical 
content or even the generalized values of Christianity or Finnishness it is 
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claimed to represent. The emotional experiences referenced by respond-
ents indicate that the ‘good’ conveyed by the song is strongly attached to 
the very experience of singing it with others at a specific event (the school-
year-ending ceremony) held at a specific place (the school), a specific age 
(childhood) and a specific time of year (spring). They reminisce about the 
sound of the hymn and the smell of spring, visceral bodily experiences that 
cannot be conveyed by referring to principles of justification, only by ap-
pealing to the familiarity of the commonplace – to those that share that 
familiarity – the ‘people’ of their populism. “I believe everyone knows it 
by heart”, as one candidate put it. 
The emotional experience of this cultural habit is tied to the actual 
physical situation, via personal attachment to a commonplace, not just 
discursive descriptions of it. ‘Tapping into’ this experience is a politiciza-
tion of the everyday experience of the ‘common people’. The implication 
is that one cannot truly understand the significance of the song unless one 
has participated in the springtime ritual by singing it. 
 The populist reaction in this case can be interpreted as an attempt to 
avoid the imperative for justification. Instead, it turns back to the heart-
lands and commonplaces of familiarity – in this case, the supposed homo-
geneous national community ‘before multiculturalism’ – to fix the crisis by 
returning to times before it happened, before the habit had to be justified, 
when one could ‘sing the song as it has always been sung’, instead of en-
gaging in a public debate over plural orders of worth. These participants 
in the debate demand the acceptance of their experience as ‘common peo-
ple’ in the sphere of politics, without need for justification by value-sys-
tems, let alone politicians, bureaucrats or other authorities. This is a pop-
ulist and exclusionary politicization of the familiar experience of ‘the com-
mon people’, to which ‘everyone’ is claimed to belong. 
5.4 Article IV: Alternative Knowledge 
Whereas Article III provided a view of the emotional component of 
populism, Article IV tackles the populist epistemology: populism’s theory 
of knowledge. While populism can be critical of intellectuals, experts and 
knowledge authorities in general, the article shows that another populist 
strategy is the creation of counterknowledge, incorporating alternative 
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knowledge authorities, and that this strategy is particularly employed by 
the populist radical right. 
Since populism opposes elites (typically in terms of political power), it 
also tends to oppose knowledge elites – that is, experts and epistemic au-
thorities. This tendency captured the public imagination in 2016, as seen 
in a proliferation of accounts in the press about so-called ‘post-truth poli-
tics’, which supposedly eschew facts in favour of emotional appeals and 
identity (e.g. Economist 10 Sep 2016, Guardian 15 Nov 2016). Previously, 
an epistemology that valorizes “the knowledge of ‘the common people,’ 
which they possess by virtue of their proximity to everyday life”, has been 
termed epistemological populism by Saurette & Gunster (2011: 199). This ten-
dency to eschew experts in favour of ‘folk wisdom’ is a well-known tool of 
populism (Cramer 2016: 123–130; Hawkins 2010: 7; Hofstadter 1962; 
2008; Oliver & Rahn 2016; Soini 1988: 4). But, as I argue in this article, 
‘epistemological populism’ is not the full picture of populist epistemology. An-
other kind of populist epistemology is what I call counterknowledge – epis-
temic opposition to established experts by the production of alternative 
knowledge authorities – and it has played a significant role in Finnish pop-
ulism in the 2010s. 
The inclusion of anti-immigrant activists in the Finns Party was largely 
made possible by their consolidation on Hommaforum.org since 2008, a dis-
cussion forum for self-proclaimed ‘critics of immigration’. More recently, 
spurred on by the spike in numbers of refugees in 2015, several ‘counter-
media’ websites sprung up, publishing political news often of questionable 
truth value; accusing immigrants of serious crimes, mainstream journalists 
of covering them up, and politicians of facilitating a destructive assault on 
Finnish society by immigrants. The most popular of these is MV-lehti 
(‘WTF Media’). ‘Countermedia’ combine facts with fiction and rumours, 
sometimes intentionally blurring the lines or spreading outright lies, other 
times cherry-picking, colouring and framing information to promote a 
radical anti-immigrant agenda. These websites quickly became im-
mensely popular, while street violence against immigrants simultaneously 
intensified and government asylum policy was tightened. 
Article IV argues that production and dissemination of counter-
knowledge can be instrumental in populist mobilization. An effective way 
to question mainstream policies, such as the intake of asylum-seekers and 
state-sanctioned multiculturalism, is to claim they are supported by false 
knowledge, and produce and circulate alternative knowledge countering 
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it. I analyse counterknowledge on Hommaforum and WTF Media by a 
combination of computational topic modeling (Bail 2014; Blei 2012; Di-
Maggio, Nag & Blei 2013; Evans 2014; Levy & Franklin 2013; Meeks & 
Weingart 2012; Mohr & Bogdanov 2013; Mohr et al. 2013) and qualita-
tive, interpretive frame analysis (Entman 1993, Nisbet 2009). The role of 
the computational analysis here is to locate the discussions of interest in 
the large dataset (more than 330,000 messages and news articles) in a way 
that is both more representative and reproducible than either a fully qual-
itative selection (such as Mäkinen 2016) or a keyword search would be. 
Qualitative frame analysis, on the other hand, provides an interpretative 
understanding, a thick description (Geertz 1973) not possible with com-
putational methods. 
According to the findings, the predominant framing of truth on Hom-
maforum and WTF Media looks similar to a populist framing of power 
and democracy. Like the populist assertion that limitations of liberal-dem-
ocratic institutions – checks and balances that are in place to protect mi-
norities – should be lifted to uphold democracy; the same applies on 
Homma and WTF for any limitations on freedom of speech, which are 
portrayed as detrimental to the truth. 
Moreover, an empiricist-positivist ‘counterknowledge epistemology’ is 
explicit especially on Homma: truths about society are presumed accessi-
ble by scientific methods, and these truths could be adopted for govern-
ance; but the multiculturalist-relativist hegemony and the corrupt re-
search community prevents such work. An example of their positivist em-
piricism is the habit of framing the immigration question as purely eco-
nomic, thus enabling calculations of the monetary value of people and 
rejection of those who are not deemed of value to the national economy 
(see also Mäkinen 2016). Such an economization of the immigration ques-
tion can in fact be described as technocratic, and as such is quite incom-
patible with the traditional populist dismissal of expert knowledge, ‘epis-
temological populism’ (Saurette & Gunster 2011). Instead, it is a political 
tool associated with the radical right. 
WTF Media is received quite positively by the anti-immigration activ-
ists of Homma, despite some contributors condemning WTF’s ‘obvious’ 
neo-Nazism and apparent political connections with Russia, using these 
connections to frame it as unreliable. Homma users praise WTF for ‘say-
ing what others won’t’; even though much of the information might be 
bogus, some of it is correct and not available elsewhere. The participants 
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emphasize that the same scepticism should be felt against mainstream me-
dia and countermedia, and that smart media consumers can assess infor-
mation themselves, without gatekeepers, like a rational homo economicus in 
a marketplace of ideas. This portrait of the ‘ideal knower’ is, again, very 
different to that of ‘epistemological populism’ (Saurette & Gunster 2011), 
in which members of the ‘common people’ know things based on their 
common sense and lived experience. The ideal homo economicus ‘knower’ of 
counterknowledge is a rational selector instead. 
Thus, it seems that unlike what Wodak (2015: 22) claims, right-wing 
populism does not simply correlate with anti-intellectualism; it is populism 
that does so. The contemporary European amalgam of populism with rad-
ical right-wing thought is in fact quite comfortable with intellectualism, as 
long as that intellectualism is technical-rational in nature and can be used 
against the ‘false truths’ of political opponents. Rather than an ambivalent 
and experiential truth orientation – as suggested by the ‘post-truth’ thesis 
and ‘epistemological populism’ – right-wing populists take some expert 
knowledge very seriously, in fact often overestimating possibilities to arrive 
at the right solutions to political issues by inquiry. Both ‘epistemological 
populism’ (populist folk wisdom) and a ‘counterknowledge epistemology’ 
(radical right rationalism) nevertheless provide tools to denounce oppo-
nents as enemies, since opponents are not only politically but epistemo-
logically wrong. 
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6 Discussion 
In this dissertation, I have argued that a sociological perspective based on 
the vocabulary of cultural toolkits and practices is useful for analysing pop-
ulism, and that populism is a useful concept for analysing society, partic-
ularly contemporary Finnish politics. Of course, this is not the only possi-
ble theoretical framework, because social scientific theories do not just 
provide hypotheses to be empirically tested, thus explaining phenomena in 
a causal sense, but must also assist in choosing the right questions and 
perspectives, and ultimately help understand society. Some of the insights 
provided by this work could perhaps have been formulated using other 
theoretical tools as well. But the practice-oriented perspective used here 
helped us to study populism in action, as something that is done by polit-
ical actors who are constrained but also enabled by their situations. This 
reminds us to consider in our studies not only institutions and the motiva-
tions of organizations and individuals – and not just cultural discourses 
either – but the agency of political actors, whether they are party politicians 
or citizens in everyday political debates. 
I believe theories in social sciences have to be assessed by their usability 
in empirical research – which I hope to have demonstrated in the four 
empirical articles – and their usability for scholarly cooperation. I want 
this latter point to emphasize that the ‘toolkit theory’ is quite compatible 
with (and translatable into the language of) many other theories employed 
in not only sociology, but political science, communication and related 
branches of study. 
If we allow ourselves to consider the ‘toolkit theory’ vindicated at least 
to some extent, what about the concept of populism? Is it a term we should 
be using; does it help us understand society? And how were populist tools 
used in the Finnish case? I hope that the four empirical articles have 
proven the relevance of populism as a concept as well. Firstly, in Article I, 
the populist juxtaposition of a positively connoted ‘people’ and a nega-
tively connoted ‘elite’ was identified as a prominent frame in Finns Party 
manifestos. But before the Eurocrisis, ‘the people’ was mostly defined as 
the ‘underclass’ and the elite as the ‘money power’ in a classical populist 
sense. The dire economic situation of the European countries, mainly in 
the South and culminating in 2010, presented the party with a new op-
portunity: because the mainstream parties were committed to the Euro 
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project, the Finns Party could begin employing an argumentative frame 
of defining the situation as a crisis for Finns as well – despite the fact that the 
crisis was buffered by the country’s strong economy and institutions – and 
blaming the crisis on the Southern countries. They were still employing 
the toolkit of populism, but ‘the people’ were re-defined in terms of the 
Finnish nation, and its opponents as European elites and the ‘lazy’ South-
erners they were coddling. In other words, they moved towards right-wing 
populism, which identifies elite-pampered Others as enemies. Their pop-
ulist toolkit was modified according to the situation, and it was made more 
exclusionary. 
In Article II, we illustrated how the populist toolkit was used in terms 
of gender: to draw a line between the ‘ordinary’, ‘common women’ of the 
Finns Party and the ‘elite feminists’ of other parties. This valorization of 
traditional womanhood led them to support caretaker positions rather 
than public positions for women. In terms of the gender gap within the 
party, the radical right tools which were identified in Article I were shown 
in Article II to be primarily deployed by the men of the party. Radical 
right politics are associated with men and masculinity. 
Moving on from the Finns Party to other parties as well as ordinary 
citizens, Article III noted the power of familiarity as a tool of populism. By 
referencing a shared emotional experience, that of singing the hymn Suvi-
virsi, political actors were able to infuse their proposition of who ‘the peo-
ple’ are with a solid experiential foundation. Those who have sung the 
hymn together were a ready-made community of feeling that was now given 
a nationalist definition. Whereas populism has often been identified as 
‘emotional’, Article III analysed the populist use of emotions as political 
tools more closely, showing the importance of familiarity. 
Finally, in Article IV, the focus turns from emotions to knowledge 
– and epistemology, theories of knowledge. It is often argued that popu-
lism valorizes ‘folk wisdom’; this has been called ‘epistemological popu-
lism’. But a combination of computational text analysis and frame analysis 
in Article IV shows that while Finnish anti-immigration activists denounce 
knowledge authorities, they often posit alternative knowledge authorities 
in their place instead of completely shunning expertise. This was identified 
as production of counterknowledge, in contrast to populist epistemology. The 
theory of the populist toolkit has trouble capturing these anti-immigration 
activists; instead counterknowledge seems to be specifically a right-wing 
populist frame. 
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Thus, not all the phenomena studied in this work neatly fit under the 
umbrella of the ‘populist toolkit’. Still, the populist toolkit has analytical 
utility, since it can separate a set of populist repertoires from others, for 
example that of radical right repertoires, in a way that takes into account 
culture in action. 
Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, M5S in Italy, the Pirate Party in 
Iceland, and Bernie Sanders in the USA prove that not only radical-right 
movements can use the populist toolkit, for better or for worse. Bornschier 
& Kriesi (2013) have argued that the populist uprising we are witnessing 
now in Europe and North America – and which has taken primarily right-
wing forms – is a delayed backlash against the New Left of the 1970s and 
1980s. If so, is the next wave going to be left-wing and/or liberal parties 
taking up the tools of populism? Should they do so, or instead embrace the 
‘new axis’ between populism and technocracy precisely by doing the op-
posite: placing themselves against the populists, by defending pluralism, 
democratic institutions, evidence-based policy, scientific knowledge and 
expertise; finding non-populist ways of listening to the grievances of the 
people, helping them voice their discontents? This is the question that 
would keep me up at night, were I a politician. 
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